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To appear i n  John Merriman, ed.,  1830 a n d . t h e  Or ig ins  
of t h e  S o c i a l  Quest ion i n  France (New York: F rank l in  Watts) -- -
Every way of s ee ing  t h e  world, wrote  Kenneth Burke, is a l s o  a way 
of no t  s ee ing  i t .  By t h i s  he meant t h a t  no s c h o l a r - c o u l d  eve r  hope t o  
glimpse t h e  magni f icent  o u t l i n e s  of a h i s t o r i c a l  landscape without  f i r s t  
, c l e a r i n g  away t h e  tangled  undergrowth of i r r e l e v a n t ,  t r i v i a l  and tangen- 
t i a l  f a c t s .  
But how do we choose what t o  c u l l  and what t o  save? More impor- 
t a n t ,  how can we reckon t h e  e f f e c t s  of such d e c i s i o n s  upon our  own and 
- 
o t h e r s 1  views of h i s t o r i c a l .  events?  When we t h i n k  of 1830, f o r  example, 
o u r  memories o r d i n a r i l y  present  us  w i t h  some key images epi tomizing what 
was s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  events .  For most of us ,  t h e  key 
image might be  a n  event l i k e  the  one a t  t h e  Hotel  de V i l l e  i n  P a r i s  on 
J u l y  31: 
Orleans,  Lafaye t te ,  t h e  municipal commissioners, 
and t h e  depu t i e s  formed a s e m i c i r c l e  f ac ing  t h e  o t h e r s ,  
and Jean  Viennet,  deputy of t h e  ~ L r a u l t .  . . read t h e  
proclamation of t h e  Deputies.. The promise of  t h e  "publ ic  
l i b e r t i e s "  a t  t h e  end won applause  and bravos, and when 
t h e  Duke reaff i rmed h i s  commitment t o  them, La faye t t e  
advanced and shook h i s  hand warmly. . . Someone produced 
a  l a r g e  t r i c o l o r  f l a g ,  and, t a k i n g  i t ,  La faye t t e  and 
Orleans advanced toge ther .  . . t o  a balcony overlooking t h e  
P lace  de  ~ r \ e v e .  On see ing  t h e  p a i r  t h e  crowd shouted, 
"Vive Lafayet te!"  bu t  ignored h i s  companion. The two men 
- .  
' drama t i ca l ly  embraced, and from t h e  crowd below came a 
/ 
thunderous response, " ~ i v e  l e  Duc dlOrleans!"  "Vive 
Lafayet te!"  
"The r epub l i can  k i s s  of  Lafaye t te , "  wrote  Lamar- 
t i n e  long a f t e r  t h e  event ,  "had made a king." (Pinkney 
1972, pp. 161-162) 
No one would doubt t h e  importance of t h e  event  descr ibed  here--the a l l i a n c e  
between monarchy and republicanism, t h e  ensh r in ing  of "publ ic  l i b e r t i e s " ,  
t h e . p o p u l a r  acc la im of t h e  new monarch. But s ee ing  dramat ic  events  as 
t h e  essence  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  au toma t i ca l ly  d i v e r t s  a t t e n t i o n  from o t h e r  - .  
. ' events  and processes  of g r e a t  importance. 
Like a l l  moments a t  which n a t i o n a l  power hangs i n  t h e  balance,  
t h e  J u l y  Days have a n  i n t r i n s i c  i n t e r e s t  f o r  h i s t o r i a n s .  For a n a l y t i c  
purposes,  however, we want t o  push t h e s e  outs tanding  events  back i n t o  
t h e  crowd of c o n f l i c t s  which surrounded them. Let  us  cons ider  a l l  v i o l e n t  
even t s  of any s i z e  which occurred from 1830 t o  1832. We have drawn 
accounts  of t hese  events  from newspapers, a r ch ives  and h i s t o r i c a l  works 
wi thout  regard t o  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  importance subsequent ly ascr ib-ed t o  
them--which i n  most cases  has  been n e g l i g i b l e .  Seen i n  t h e  company of 
t hese  poorly-known c o n f l i c t s ,  t h e  s t r e e t  f i g h t i n g  i n  P a r i s  dur ing  t h e  
per iod  of  J u l y  27 t o  29 appears  a s  one phase i n  a  long success ion  of 
v i o l e n t  encounters .  The fo l lowing  & suggest  t h e  range: 
March 24, 1830: I n  Merdrignac ( ~ G t e s - d u - ~ o r d )  , t h e  Bishop 
t r i e s  t o  remove the  sac red  ornaments from a d iscont inued  
church, b u t  i s  met by a crowd of 200, i nc lud ing  many women. 
The cure'has t o  f l e e  t h e  church, as t h e  crowd throws back 
t h e  gendarmes and s e i z e s  t h e  keys t o  t h e  church from t h e  
/ 
mayor. ( Journa l  des  Debats, 3/25/1830) -
J u l y  29-31, 1830: I n  Amiens (Somme), " the  emotion of t he  
events  i n  P a r i s  begins  t o  spread  i n  Amiens. The crowd f i l l s  
t h e  s t r e e t s ,  a l i v e  w i t h  rumors. . . Impromptu o r a t o r s  
urge  the  people t o  r e v o l t .  I n  t h e  evening, crowds of 
r i o t e r s  break  s t r e e t  lamps, t e a r  down and t rample t h e  
f l eu r -de - l i s  s i g n s  of  t h e  r o y a l  m i n i s t e r s ,  shou t ing  
 o own wi th  Charles  X!"' -(Calonne 1906: 180) A crowd 
breaks  i n t o  a seminary, bu t  decamps when t roops  a r r i v e  wi th  
t h e  mayor a t  2 A.M. On t h e  30th and 31s t  come demonstra- 
t i o n s  and p u b l i c  meetings, b u t  s u b s t a n t i a l  detachments of 
cava l ry ,  gendarmes and National  Guards keep th ings  under 
c o n t r o l .  (Calonne 1906; - Le Moniteur, 8/2/1830) 
September 15, 1830: A t  Moissac (Tarn-et-Garonne), a 
1 I gang of subversives"  i nc lud ing  wine merchants and workers 
. . 
. . . . 
' of a l l  s o r t s  marches on t h e  house of t h e  t a x  c o l l e c t o r  
shout ing   o own wi th  t h e  exc i se  taxes!" The o f f i c i a l  
hands over  a l l  h i s  papers  and r e g i s t e r s ,  which t h e  crowd 
. . .  
burns a t  once. Prom the re ,  t h e  "subversives" go t o  t h e  
. . , .  . . . . o f f i c i a l .  i n  charge of tobacco t axes ,  and burn  his f i l e s .  
The crowd marches on two t a x  o f f i c e s ,  breaks up some of 
t h e  f u r n i t u r e ,  and burns f i l e s .  Nat ional  Guards, r e in fo rced  
by "good c i t i z e n s , "  make a r r e s t s  and d i s p e r s e  t h e  crowd. 
(Archives ~ a t i o n a l e s ,  B B ' ~  1188) 
May 2, 1831: I n  Bordeaux (Gironde),  a crowd of longsawyers 
and o t h e r  workers go t o  t h e  Helfenberger  sawmill and 
des t roy  t h e  steam engine which s u p p l i e s  power the re .  Af t e r  
t he  National  Guard c l e a r s  them o u t ,  t h e  workers assemble 
i n  a nearby square  and warn o t h e r  m i l l  owners t o  d ismant le  
t h e i r  machines. L a t e r ,  o t h e r  groups of workers demonstrate  
elsewhere,  chase  employed workers o f f  t h e  job, and demand 
bo th  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of steam engines and t h e  expuls ion  of 
o u t s i d e  workers from Bordeaux. Nat iona l  Guards and 
r e g u l a r  t roops  d i s p e r s e  them and make a r r e s t s .  (Le Con- 
s t i t u t i o n n e l ,  5/7/1831) ' 
June 2, 1832: A t  the  Saturday market of Auch (Gers) ,  a 
. - crowd t h r e a t e n s  c e r t a i n  merchants who "had t h e  weakness t o  
g ive  i n  t o  t h a t  v io l ence  and s o l d  t h e i r  g r a i n  a t  25 f r a n c s  
. . 
p e r  h e c t o l i t e r ,  i n s t e a d  of t h e  27 and 28 f r a n c s  which was 
. . 
i ts  t r u e  p r i c e  and which they had asked a t  f i r s t . "  The 
day be fo re ,  a t  nearby Fleurance,  a s i m i l a r  crowd had 
roughed up merchants,  dumped g r a i n  wagons and s p l i t  open 
sacks  of g r a i n .  (Le - Cons t i t u t ionne l ,  6/11/1832) 
. .  . 
. ' ~ o s t  of t h e s e  ' events  a r e  f a r  removed from t h e  dramat ic  a c t i o n s  t h e  word .. 
I1 r evolu t ion"  u s u a l l y  evokes. Except f o r  t h e  response t o ' t h e  J u l y  Days 
. . 
. . ' i n  Amiens, none of them is  obviously connected t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r  
. . 
, . of 'power .  Yet i n  complex and i n d i r e c t  ways they were a l l  connected t o  
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  process  and ' t he  changing s t r u c t u r e  of power. The 
whole p a t t e r n  of  t hese  apparent ly  t r i v i a l  and non-revolutionary events  
. . changed a s  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  moved on. The change i n  p a t t e r n  r e f l e c t e d  and 
a f f e c t e d  t h e  development of t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power. 
What we ordi.nari 'ly i d e n t i f y  a s  " the revolu t ion"  marked b u t  one 
p a r t  of a process  which took years  t o  unfold.  The process  was by no 
means s t r i c t l y  v i o l e n t .  The a c t i o n s  involved r a n  t h e  whole gamut from 
../ . : s t r e e t  f i g h t i n g  t o  solemn par l iamentary  debates  and querulous back-room 
. . 
barga in ing .  But t h e  a c t i n g  out  of t h e s e  c o n f l i c t s  brought about  changes 
i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of v i o l e n t  p o l i t i c a l  events  over  t h e  per iod  from 1830 
t o  1832. The r evo lu t iona ry  days r ep re sen ted  a  h igh  water  mark of 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i n  France dur ing  t h i s  per iod ,  bu t  by no means t h e  
only  such peak. And t h e  s e t t i n g s  and p a r t i e s  accounting f o r  the'se 
f l u c t u a t i o n s  s h i f t e d  w i t h  t h e  moving conf igu ra t ions  of power i n  France 
du r ing  t h i s  t ime.  How t h a t  happened is t h e  cent la  1 problem of t h i s  
paper .  
Natura l  H i s t o r i e s  of Revolution 
Nor were these  changing power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  themselves ex t ra -  
o rd ina ry ,  i n  t h e  sense  of be ing  a t y p i c a l  of French p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  
o t h e r  pe r iods .  Of course,  1830 is  t y p i c a l l y  seen  a s  ex t r ao rd ina ry  eo 
ipso--a r evo lu t iona ry  yea r ,  a  c lear -cu t  break  i n  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t i n u i t y .  
But t h e  f a c t  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  h a s  o'ften b l inded  a n a l y s t s  
of revolution--and e s p e c i a l l y  soc io log i s t s - - to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n t e s t s ,  
. :-- ' - i n t e r e s t s  and al ignments  i n  which t h e  t r a n s f e r  i s  embedded a r e  t h e  s t u f f  
of "normal" p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  
Here we break  wi th  most ve r s ions  of what s o c i o l o g i s t s  have termed 
I 1  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  theor ies1 '  of r evo lu t ion .  The i n t u i t i v e  charm of viewing 
r e v o l u t i o n  a s  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zormal s o c i a l  process ,  as a  unique 
s p e c i e s  fol lowing a  coherent ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  l i f e  h i s t o r y ,  has  encouraged 
w r i t e r  a f t e r  w r i t e r  to. p lay  Audubon t o  r e v o l u t i o n ,  f i r s t  o u t l i n i n g  t h e  
l i f e  c y c l e  and then o f f e r i n g  a  number of c o l o r f u l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s .  Few 
have thought t o  c r i t i c i z e  t h e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i c a l  analogy i t s e l f ,  and 
. . - . .  no one has  assembled t h e  s o r t  o f  sys t ema t i c  evidence i t  would a c t u a l l y  
. t a k e  t o  t e s t  t hose  few por t ions  of t h e  a v a i l a b l e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s  of 
r e v o l u t i o n  which w i l l  s u rv ive  l o g i c a l  s c r u t i n y .  
Sometimes t h e  sense  of r e v o l u t i o n  as a .  depa r tu re  from normali ty  
appears  f r a n k l y  i n  t h e  language of pathology.  Crane ~ r i n t o n ' s  urbane 
. ,  . .' Anatomy - of Revolut ion,  f o r  example, l i k e n s  -the-development of r e v o l u t i o n  
t o  t h a t  of a  fever :  
I n  t h e  s o c i e t y  during t h e  gene ra t ion  o r  s o  be fo re  t h e  
outbreak of r evo lu t ion ,  i n  t h e  o l d  regime, t h e r e  w i l l  b e  
found s i g n s  of t h e  coming d i s t u r b a n c e s .  . . Then comes t h e  
time when the  f u l l  symptoms d i s c l o s e  themselves,  and when w e  
can  say  t h e  f e v e r  of r e v o l u t i o n  h a s  begun. This  works up. . . 
t o  a  c r i s i s ,  f r equen t ly  accompanied by de l i r ium,  t h e  r u l e  
of t h e  most v i o l e n t  ' r e v o l u t i o n i s t s ,  t h e  Reign of Te r ro r .  
Af t e r  t h e  c r i s i s  comes a  pe r iod  o f  convalescence, u sua l ly  
marked by a  r e l a p s e  o r  two. F i n a l l y ,  t h e  f eve r  i s  over ,  and 
t h e  p a t i e n t  i s  himself aga in .  . . (1952,.pp. 17-18) 
We do not  propose t o  j o i n  the  o ld  game of Improving Brinton.  (Simple 
r u l e s ,  f o r  those  a s  y e t  u n i n i t i a t e d :  Inn ing  One: Scold Br in ton  f o r  
h i s  p re jud ices ;  show no q u a r t e r .  Inn ing  Two: Promulgate a r ev i sed  
v e r s i o n  of ~ r i n t o n ' s  s t a g e s  of r evo lu t ion .  Inn ing  Three: Congratulate  
your se l f  on your achieve-ment.) Nor do we in t end  t o  argue wi th  Br in ton ' s  
h i s t o r i c a l  judgments about t h e  s p e c i f i c  r evo lu t ions  he  took up, a l though 
we d i s a g r e e  wi th  a  number of them. We hope i n s t e a d  (1) t o  i d e n t i f y  
, . some of the  gene ra l  reasons why n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  models of r e v o l u t i o n  
have worked badly and a r e  not  l i k e l y  t o  work w e l l  (2) t o  block out  a n  
a l t e r n a t i v e  model of r evo lu t ion  emphasizing i t s  c o n t i n u i t i e s  wi th  r o u t i n e  
con ten t ion  f o r  power and (3)  t o  check some of t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of t h a t  
model a g a i n s t  a  s e r i e s  of events  f o r  which a n  unusual s t o r e  of in format ion  
i s  a v a i l a b l e :  t h e  French Revolution of 1830. 
The turmoi l s  of t he  1960s i n  Europe and America have s t imula ted  
a g r e a t  d e a l  of new work, some of i t  e x c e l l e n t ,  on r evo lu t ion ,  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n f l i c t ,  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and r e l a t e d  processes .  Among o t h e r s ,  Bienen 
(1968), Gurr (1970) and Russe l l  (1974) have r ecen t ly -p rov ided  wide-ranging 
reviews of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  We have ourse lves '  tu rned  our hands t o  c r i t i c i s m  
and s y n t h e s i s  e lsewhere (e .g.  T i l l y  and Rule 1965, T i l l y  1964, 1974a).  
A s  a consequence, t h e r e  i s  no need t o  review t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  as a  whole 
. . here .  
Two o r  t h r e e  comments w i l l  s u f f i c e .  F i r s t ,  almost a l l  r e c e n t  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  work on p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t ,  i nc lud ing  r evo lu t ion ,  has  con- 
s i s t e d  of comparisons of  numerous c o u n t r i e s  a t  approximately t h e  same 
po in t  i n  t ime r a t h e r  than  of t h e  ana lyses  of change over t ime which would . . 
be appropr i a t e  f o r  t h e  d i r e c t  t e s t i n g  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  hypotheses 
(e .g.  Feierabend and Feierabend 1966, Gurr 1968 and 1970, Rummel 1966; 
among t h e  r a r e  except ions  a r e  Kirkham, Levy and Crot ty  1970, Russe l l  
1974).  Second, s o c i a l  h i s t o r i a n s  have r e c e n t l y  been doing r i c h ,  system- 
a t i c  work on t h e  forms and personnel  of r e v o l u t i o n  i n  Europe and America 
(e .g.  Cobb 1961-63, C.S.L. Davies 1969, Hofs t ad te r  1970, Rud6 1970, 
Williams 1968); t h a t  work, which o f t e n  does t r e a t  change over t ime, is  
more d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  models, 
b u t  has  not  so  f a r  been employed i n  t h a t  way. Third,  r e c e n t  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  have tended t o  lump revo lu t ions  toge ther  
wi th  o t h e r  forms of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  under headings l i k e  " i n t e r n a l  
war," " i n s t a b i l i t y , "  " c i v i l  violence,"  "aggress ive  behavior" o r  simply, 
11 v io lence ."  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  proposal  of d i s t i n c t  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s  f o r  
r e v o l u t i o n  i t s e l f  has  become r a r e r  than  i t  used t o  be.  
Natura l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i s t s  d i f f e r  from o t h e r  s t u d e n t s  of t h e  sub- 
j e c t  i n  t h a t  they d e p i c t  r evo lu t ion  a s  t h e  culminat ion of a s e r i e s  of 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i s t i n c t  developmental s t a g e s .  The s t a g e s  form a s tandard  
sequence; one s t a g e  cannot manifest  i t s e l f  u n t i l  t h e  preceding one is  
complete. I n  some cases  t he  r evo lu t iona ry  change r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  end of 
t h e  c y c l e ,  t h e .  f i n a l  s t a g e  of r evo lu t iona ry  development. ' ~ l s e w h e r e ,  t h e r e  
a r e  s t a g e s  subsequent t o  t he  r evo lu t ion ,  through which t h e  s o c i e t y  moves 
from chaos back t o  normal i ty .  I n  gene ra l ,  t h e  appearance of t h e  f i r s t  
s t a g e s  is a warning o r  a  promise, bu t  no t  a c e r t a i n  s i g n  t h a t  t h e  process  
w i l l  r un  i ts  f u l l  course .  What mark t h i s  v a r i e t y  of t h e o r i z i n g  as n a t u r a l  
h i s t o r y  a r e  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  a )  t h a t  t h e  " l a t e "  developmental s t a g e s  do not  
appear u n l e s s  t h e  "ear ly" ones have a l r eady  occurred and b)  t h a t  some 
s o r t  of i n n e r  l o g i c  p rope l s  t h e  process ,  s o  t h a t  i n  t h e  absence of major 
o b s t a c l e s  i t  w i l l  work ou t  a  s tandard  sequence. Revolut ions,  l i k e  b u t t e r -  
. f l i e s ,  have n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i e s .  
The number and content  of t h e  s t a g e s  v a r i e s  widely from one 
. . 
. n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i c a l  scheme t o  another .  I n  Br in ton ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  f i r s t  
s t a g e s  a r e  cha rac t e r i zed  by widespread governmental i n e f f i c i e n c y  i n  t imes 
of r e l a t i v e  p r o s p e r i t y ,  followed by t h e  d e s e r t i o n  of t h e  government by 
t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  Next comes an  i n c r e a s i n g  popular  r evo lu t iona ry  
excitement l ead ing  t o  t h e  overthrow of t h e  o l d  regime, followed by a  
per iod  of r u l e  by moderate r evo lu t iona ry  elements.  F i n a l l y  comes t h e  
11 r u l e  of t e r r o r  and v io l ence , "  followed by a  r e t u r n  t o  something l i k e  
t h e  s t a t u s  quo a n t e .  
Rex Hopper (1950), another  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i s t ,  s e e s  four  
s t ages :  
--Preliminary S tage  of Mass Excitement and Unrest 
--Popular S tage  of Crowd Excitement and Unrest 
--Formal Stage of Formulation of I s s u e s  and t h e  Formation of 
Pub l i c s  
- - I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Stage of Lega l i za t ion  and S o c i e t a l  Organizat ion.  
Far more than  Br in ton ' s ,  Hopper's s t a g e s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  s t a t e s  of mind of 
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  and pro to- revolu t ionary  popula t ion ,  and thus  sum up a  
s o c i a l  psychology of r evo lu t ion .  
These s t a g e  schemes have many v a r i a n t s ,  most of them i n t e r e s t i n g .  . 
and a l l  of them inconclus ive .  We could review Sorokin ' s  two s t a g e s ,  
Meadows' t h r e e  o r  Edwards' f i v e  and g a i n  i n s i g h t  from each one. But how 
would we choose among t h e  bewildering a r r ay?  Presumably by examining 
t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  cons is tency ,  t h e i r  openness t o  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o r  f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  
t h e i r  v a l u e  i n  reducing complex phenomena t o  t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l s ,  t h e i r  
f r u i t f u l n e s s  a s  guides t o  empi r i ca l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  and t h e  f i t  between 
t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h a t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n . a n d  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  d e r i v a b l e  from 
t h e  scheme. 
On t h e s e  grounds ( a s  opposed t o  t h e  m o r a l , . a e s t h e t i c  o r  h e u r i s t i c  
grounds one might a l s o  invoke f o r  t h e  judgment of such schemes), t h e  
n a t u r a l  h i s t o r i c a l  ana lyses  of  r e v o l u t i o n  s t a n d  up poorly.  Their  l og ic  
i s  p e c u l i a r ,  t h e i r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  proof s l i g h t ,  t h e i r  r educ t ion  of 
complexity undoubted b u t  misd i rec ted ,  t h e i r  f r u i t f u l n e s s  f o r  f u r t h e r  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  s t r i k i n g l y  l i m i t e d  and t h e i r  f i t  w i t h  o t h e r  f a c t s  than  
those  from which theyewere o r i g i n a l l y  i n f e r r e d  q u i t e  bad. Most of t hese  
shortcomings s p r i n g  from the  very  modus operandi  of n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y ,  and 
a r e  t h e r e f o r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  d isappear .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t he  p r a c t i c e  of 
working backward from outcome t o  an tecedent  cond i t i ons  provides  l i t t l e  
means (and no i n c e n t i v e )  t o  determine how f r equen t ly ,  and under what 
c ircumstances,  those  same antecedent  cond i t i ons  e x i s t  without  t h e  develop- 
ment of r evo lu t ion .  That having reasoned backward we should present  our 
conclusions forward, and in a dramaturgic framework, only aggravates the 
difficulty. 
Let us concretize our complaints by scrutinizing three sophisti- 
cated recent statements, the first by James Davies, the second by Neil 
Smelser, the third by Chalmers Johnson. The first is marginal to natural 
history, the second contains a very special version of natural history in 
application to a wide range of phenomena which happen to include revolution, 
the third belongs squarely in the great tradition of natural histories 
of revolution. 
Davies on the J-Curve 
Davies (1962) does not present a scheme of "stages" as such; he 
does argue that a set of qualitative developmental changes lead to revo- 
lutionary outbreaks and that the full manifestation of all these changes 
is necessary before a revolution can take place. The crux is that revolu- 
tions "are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic or 
social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal" 
(1962, p. 4). "~conomic or social development," in turn, is "opportunity 
to satisfy basic needs, which may range from merely physical. . . to 
social. . ." (1962, p. 8). Davies considers three successful revolutions-- 
~orr's Rebellion in early nineteenth century Rhode Island, the Russian 
revolution of 1917, and the Egyptian revolution of 1952--and finds 
evidence of such a pattern in each case. He refers to the pattern as 
the "J-curve" of need-satisfaction, with the progressive period of 
increasing satisfaction representing the shaft of the J and the sharp 
downturn its crook. 
~avies' scheme requires some sort of weighting and summing of 
the satisfaction of "human needs" in a population. Unless that assessment 
of needs i s  bo th  reasonably accu ra t e  and l o g i c a l l y  independent of t h e  
behavior  i t  is  supposed t o  expla in ,  t h e  scheme w i l l - p r o v i d e  no means of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  wi th  a  high l i k e l i h o o d  of r e v o l u t i o n  fro:m 
o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n s .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  Davies r eads  back from t h e  f a c t  of revolu- 
t i o n  t o ' t h e  presumably f r u s t r a t e d  needs, and s h i f t s  t h e  weights  assigned 
t o  v a r i o u s  needs a long  t h e  way. The d i s c u s s i o n  of ~ o r r ' s  r e b e l l i o n ,  f o r  
example, d e r i v e s  t h e  long upward s l o p e  of  t h e  J-curve i n  terms of t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g  p r o s p e r i t y  of t h e  t e x t i l e  i ndus t ry ,  on which a  l a r g e  segment 
of t h e  popula t ion  depended. But t h e  f i n a l  "sharp r e v e r s a l t '  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  
the  v i o l e n t  ou tbreak  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  of demands f o r  
popular  s u f f r a g e  i n  t h e  s t a t e .  Davies employs s i m i l a r  mixtures  of needs 
i n  t h e  development of J-curves f o r  o t h e r  revolu t2ons .  The mixing and 
s h i f t i n g  of needs makes i t  e a s i e r  t o  f a sh ion  a p l a u s i b l e  f i t  of t h e  
theory t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  r evo lu t ion .  But makes i t  correspondingly more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  draw any r e l i a b l e  i n fe rence  t o  t h e  cases  of r e v o l u t i o n  (o r ,  
f o r  t h a t  ma t t e r ,  of nonrevolut ion)  no t  y e t  inspec ted .  
The p o i n t  i s  no quibble .  On t h e  con t r a ry  i t  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  
. . .  
v i a b i l i t y  of ~ a v i e s '  argument. Davies appears  t o  start wi th  t h e  accom- 
p l i shed  f a c t  of r evo lu t ion ,  then c a s t  about  i n  t h e  per iod  immediately 
. preceding i t  f o r  evidence of t he  sharp  r e v e r s a l  of some need w i t h i n  some 
p a r t  of t h e  popula t ion ,  then look f a r t h e r  back f o r  needs which have 
undergone i n c r e a s i n g  s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  some l eng th  of time. Given t h a t  
- 
d i f f e r e n t  groups i n  any popula t ion  exper ience  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and 
f r u s t r a t i o n  of va r ious  needs a t  va r ious  t imes, such a  s ea rch  has  a h igh  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of success .  It a l s o  has a  h igh  p r o b a b i l i t y  of i d e n t i f y i n g  
a s  c r u c i a l  f o r  r e v o l u t i o n  circumstances which a r e  i n  f a c t  commonplace 
o u t s i d e  of revolut ions--as  wi th  t h e  famed methodologist  who achieved a  
hangover w i t h  bourbon and water ,  sco tch  and water ,  no t  t o  mention r y e  and 
water, and t h e r e f o r e  stopped dr inking  t h e  of fending-subs tance :  water .  
So what of f r u s t r a t i o n s  which do no t  r e s u l t  i n  r evo lu t ion?  
F r u s t r a t i o n  is  a s  endemic i n  s o c i a l  l i f e  as need - sa t i s f ac t ions  a r e  
va r ious .  Needs, as Davies himself p o i n t s  o u t ,  a r e  always e l a s t i c ,  ex- 
panding t o  encompass more than  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  en joys  a t  p resent ;  t h i s  
d i s p a r i t y  presumably always e n t a i l s  i ts  degree  of f r u s t r a t i o n .  For 
Davies, t h e  c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  is  between what one might t h ink  of a s  
r o u t i n e  f r u s t r a t i o n  and a  "sudden, s h a r p  r e v e r s a l "  of need s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
. .. 
How one could a c t u a l l y  hope t o  measure t h e  degree of d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t h e s e  two s t a t e s  a t  any one po in t  i n  t i m e ,  l e t  a l o n e  over  a s e r i e s  of 
p o i n t s  f o r ,  say, t h e  e n t i r e  popula t ion  o f  a  country,  i s  no t  c l e a r .  
Davies sugges t s  a pub l i c  opinion p o l l ,  b u t  n e g l e c t s  t o  mention what kind 
of p o l l  would do t h e  job.  Is t h e r e  any way t o  determine t h a t  t h e  "gap 
between what people want and what they g e t "  ( t o  u se  ~ a v i e s '  words) is 
" in to l e rab le"  o t h e r  than  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they  r e f u s e  t o  t o l e r a t e  i t ?  
This  desu l to ry  picking at t h e  scabs  of ~ a v i e s '  scheme f i n a l l y  
uncovers t h e  r e a l  wound underneath. The a c t o r  has  absconded! Who - 
endures t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n s  i n  ques t ion ,  who makes r evo lu t ions ,  and what 
connect ion do t h e  two,ac tors  have wi th  each o t h e r ?  The J-curve formula- 
t i o n  o f f e r s  u s  two equal ly  absurd a l t e r n a t i v e s :  
a )  r e g a r d l e s s  of who exper iences  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  of c r u c i a l  
needs, t h e  "society" a s  a  whole responds t o  them,.and 
beyond some threshold  t h e  response  t akes  t h e  fonn of 
r evo lu t ion ;  
b)  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p ropens i ty  t o  foment o r  j o i n  revolut ion-  
a r y  a c t i o n  i s  d i r e c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  h i s  degree  of  
frustration, hence revolutions occur when more than some 
critical number of individuals are performing revolutionary 
actions and hence revolutionaries come from the most 
frustrated segments of the population--frustrated, to be 
sure, by the special up-then-down process Davies describes. 
On the surface, the second alternative will appear more plausible to 
those who do not find the reification of Society attractive. Unfortunately, 
closer scrutiny reveals that the second alternative not only compounds 
the practical difficulties already discussed by requiring the weighting 
and summing of frustrations for each individual, or at least each group, 
within the population in question, but also treats as automatic precisely 
what is most problematic about the development of. revolutions: the 
transition from uncoordinated individual dissatisfactions to collective 
assaults on the holders of power. Nor is it a simple matter of filling 
in the blanks. The fillings for these particular blanks will.cause 
the essential structure of the J-curve hypothesis to explode through 
contradiction or to decay through qualification. 
Smelser on ~olle'ctive Behavior 
Smelser's system (1963) is richer and more consistent than ~avies'. 
It is thus more likely to survive quick criticism. Collective behavior, 
of course, includes the whole range of non-normative behavior carried 
on by groups of men; revolution constitutes a subtype of a more general 
case. Nevertheless, Smelser takes pains to show that all the various 
species'of collective behavior exhibit the developmental stages which he 
posits. 
The scheme specifies six conditions which must be met, or 
I I "activated, before an episode of collective behavior can take place 
(1962, pp. 15-17). They are (1) structural conduciveness or "permissive- 
ness" of the social structure. to a given form of collective behavior; 
. , 
(2) structural strain; (3) growth and spread of a generalized belief; 
(4) precipitating factors; (5) mobilization of participants for action; 
(6) the operation of social control. Whi.le all these elements may exkt 
for varying lengths of time before the episode of collective behavior 
even begins, they enter the process itself in precisely that order. 
Hence the description of the scheme as a "value-added" analysis. 
Smelser's is the most systematic and helpful discussion of the 
defining features of collective behavior we have. The natural-historical 
portion of the work, however, rests on propositions which are obvious or 
which represent explications of the initial definition of collective 
behavior. This becomes apparent when one attempts to derive predictions 
of the form, locus and intensity of collective behavior in different 
social settings from those propositions. 
Structural conduciveness, for example, means simply that collec- 
tive behavior, like any other behavior, is circumscribed by its social 
context. The occurrence of a financial panic, Smelser points out, pre- 
supposes the existence of a money economy. Structural strain, the 
second determinant, seems to mean any sort of shared dissatisfaction with 
the way the world works (although at times it shifts to the structural 
conditions--e.g. role-conflict--under which such shared dissatisfactions 
arise). Since collective behavior means some collective attempt to make 
the world work differently, Smelser has simply called our attention to 
the fact that people do not act together to contravene existing social 
patterns unless motivated to do so. 
The same s o r t  of observa t ions  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  t h i r d  determinant ,  
11 growth and spread  of a  genera l ized  b e l i e f  ," which appears  t o  mean t h a t  
people do not  a c t  concer ted ly  un le s s  they s h a r e  some common percept ions  
of t h e i r  s o c i a l  world. (Smelser 's  sugges t ion  t h a t  such genera l ized  
b e l i e f s  i nc lude  a  symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  s t r a i n s  t o  which t h e  
a c t o r s  a r e  responding, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i s  more i n t r i g u i n g ,  l e s s  obvious 
and more open t o  empi r i ca l  v e r i f i c a t i o n ) .  The e f f e c t  of any p a r t i c u l a r  
s e t  of " p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s "  a g a i n  appears  only t o  lend  i t s e l f  t o  
es tab l i shment  a f t e r  t h e  f a c t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  have no p r e d i c t i v e  va lue .  
The f i f t h  de te rminant ,  "mobi l iza t ion  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  f o r  a c t i o n , " . s t a t e s  
t h e  t ru ism t h a t  only mobil ized men a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  Like Davies '  l e a p '  
from d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  t o  r e b e l l i o n ,  i t  l eaves  t h e . e s s e n t i a 1  ques t ions  
untouched: where, when and how does t h e  mob i l i za t ion  a c t u a l l y  occur? 
The l a s t  determinant ,  t h e  "opera t ion  of s o c i a l  con t ro l , "  does 
no t  run  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  f i r s t  f i v e .  It is  unclear  why t h e  workings of 
s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  should a f f e c t  c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  only a f t e r  people a r e  
mobilized f o r  a c t i o n ;  Smelser himself seems t o  i nc lude  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  among t h e  cond i t i ons  of s t r u c t u r a l  conduciveness,  h i s  
f i r s t  de te rminant .  I f  we drop t h e  i d e a  of sequence, however, we a r e  
l e f t  w i th  t h e  obse rva t ion  t h a t  o t h e r s  r e s i s t  c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  and 
t h e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  and t h e  co l lec-  
t i v e  behavior  produces a  new equi l ibr ium.  The f i r s t  e n t e r s  i n t o  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  s i n c e  without  r e s i s t a n c e  we 
would never d e t e c t  i t s  occurrence;  t h e  second is  merely a conceptual  
convenience not  open t o  proof ,  an  a r t i f a c t  of t h e  obse rve r ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  
t o  mark a  beginning and a n  end t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n c e  of  c o l l e c t i v e  
d e v i a t i o n  from expected behavior .  
In short, Smelser's scheme of stages turns out to be the careful 
explication of a definition--quite a useful definition, but a definition 
nonetheless. This disappointing result comes from the characteristic 
modus operandi of sociological natural history: starting with the identi- 
fic.ation of the "species" and working backwards to identify its necessary 
antecedents. The result is the identification of stages in the develop- 
ment of the species which are either present by definition or common in 
situations which do not produce the species. The actual work of explana- 
tion only begins* at that point. 
Johnson on Revolutionary Change 
Chalmers ~ohnson's Revolutionary Change (1968) exhibits most of 
the same difficulties. Like Davies and Smelser,.Johnson views the life- 
cycle of revolution as a homeostatic process, in which the early stages 
of growing disequilibration lead to the climactic events of the change 
of regime itself, to be followed by re-equilibrating processes which 
bring the society back to its accustomed balance. Like Smelser, Johnson 
defines the main condition of normality in terms of value-integration, 
and portrays the first condition of susceptibility to revolution the 
failure of synchronization between values and realities. In particular, 
Johnson sees that failure as manifesting itself in the population's 
withdrawal 03 moral authority from the government. He sees three clusters 
of causes of revolution: 
First, there are the pressures created by a dis-equili- 
brated social system--a society which is changing and 
which is in need of further change if it is to continue 
to exist. Of all the characteristics of the disequili- 
brated system, the one that contributes most directly to 
a revolution is power deflation--the fact that during a 
period of change the integration of a system depends in- 
creasingly upon the maintenance and deployuient of force 
by the occupants of the formal authority statuses. 
The second cluster of necessary causes revolves around 
the quality of the purposeful change being undertaken 
while a system is disequilihrated. This quality depends 
upon the abilities of the legitimate leaders. If they 
are unable to develop policies which will maintain the 
confidence of nondeviant actors in the system and its 
capacity to move toward resynchronization, a loss of 
authoritv will ensue. Such a loss means. that the use 
I 
of force h!7 the elite is no lonper considered legitimate, 
alt!:ou~h it does not necessarily rean a revolution will 
occur at once. . . 
The final, or sufficient, cause of a revolution is some 
ingredie~t, usllallv contributed by fortune, which de~rives 
the ellte of its chief weapon for enforcing social be- 
havior (e.~. an arv.y mutiny), or which leads a group of 
revolutionaries to believe that they have the means to 
deprive the elj.te of its weapons of coercion. (1968, p. 91) 
Johnson then attempts to link these very general phenomena to individual 
behavior throuph the sequence: rapid ckirge-systematic disequili- 
brium--0vertaxin.q of existing veans of Ilomeostatic and purposive res- 
ponse to change--panic-anxiety-shave-guilt-depression et~.--formation 
of novenents of Frotest. True to his predecessors, he proposes the 
suicide rate as a prime index of disequilibrium. 
The rese~blances to Davies' and, especially, Smelserfs argu- 
ments are striking. The drav7back.s are similar. To the extent that 
I1 failed synchronization between values and realities" can be identified 
at all independently of the revolutionary behavior it is supposed to 
predict, the evidence that it differentiates revolutionary settings 
from others is in extremely short supply. That failure is the general 
condition of mankind. Similarly, it is true by definition that power 
deflates and lepftinate leaders lose authority during revolutions, but 
nothing in t5e evidence known to us indicates that the deflations and 
loss necessarily precede - revolutions or, conversely, that their occur- 
rence predicts to revolution. (he could, if trilling to work within 
this conceptrlal frame~drork, manufacture a plausible case that despite 
the disagreeable resistance of Parlia~ent, Charles ~'s'power was &- 
flatinp up to shorly before the orrt5reak of the Civil War in 1642; it 
is even easier to point out how regularly terror quells dissent). Only 
moving Sack7,rard f rm the fact of revolution to its presumed standard 
features makes it so easy to arrive at such helpless propositions. 
Again t:e face the Case of tPe Absconded Actor. The ideas of 
Dower deflation and loss of authority treat generalized inabilities of 
a regime to nake its.dictates felt, widespread opposition to the exer- 
. . . . 
cise of governnental pover. That the inability should he generalized 
and the opposition widespread gain credibility from their connection 
with the underlying assumption that "a whole society'! someho~~ expresses 
itself in revolution. We would he inclined to deny the existence of 
any such actor as a "Whole Society" as r7ell as the utility of His in- 
vention. But even leaving aside doubts on that score for some other 
polenical occasion, it is not clear that the assumption helps in 
solving the problem at hand. The nub of revolution is a seizure of 
power over a governmental apparatus by one group from another. If 
we want to limit the portentous word "revolution" to those cases in 
which the groups are social classes and/or the seizure of power pro- 
duces extensive changes in social life; so be it. It remains that the 
bare requirements of such a change are the involvement of only a 
small portion of the population. Nor does it seen at all likely that 
a relatively uniforv state of mind on the part of the remainder of 
the population is a necessary condition for such a change. Yet except 
for the important pofnt concerning the control of the military and 
other repressive forces, Johnson's argument provides us with no reliable 
way of anticipating either the nature of the conflict or the identity 
of the participants. Smelser's scheme, Davies' and, indeed, the whole 
ranre of natural hfstorical theorizing leaves those central explanatory 
questions virtually untouchefi. 
In tlleir present condition, natural-history theories of revolu- 
tion are nearly irrefutable--not because they are manifestly correct, 
but because they consist mainly of ways of rationalizing events after 
the fact. Even Crane Brinton, who provides us with the most concrete 
characterizations of the stapes of revoliltion, offers them as no more 
than preliminary empirical g e n e r a l i z a t i ~ n s ~ r e s t r i c t e d  to the few great 
revolutions he takes up. Any effort to apply systematic evidence to the 
available natural-historical analyses will therefore require recasting 
the arguments into testable propositions. The model which we propose 
below aims in that direction. It is a kind of natural history theory 
in that it views re~rolutionary violence as a stage in the development 
of broader political changes. Rut it differs from the theories 
discussed above in that it identifies these changes not as "abnormal," 
but as the stuff of normal political life. 
A Political Process Fodel 
For any population, we may ask whether there exist one or more 
organizations controlling the principal concentrated means of coercion 
within the populatton.. Such or~anizations are governments. We may. 
then enunerate all groups vithin the population which, during some 
particular span of the, collectively apply resources to the influence 
of a certain government. They are contendersfor power with respect 
to that govern.~;ent. To the extent that a contender can routinely lay 
claim to the generation of action or yielding of resources by agents 
of the government, the contender is a nember of the polity, which 
therefore consists of all contenders successfully exercising routine 
claims to Eovercment responqe. Soae groups are not contenders, and 
some contenders (which we call challen~ers) are not members of the 
polity; the members of the polity differ anong themselves in the amount 
and type of response their appll.catl.on of resources to the government 
0 
produces. 
So much for definjtions. We ioagine the general operation of 
polities in the following vay: Every polity establishes tests of 
membership, and all polities include among such tests the ability to 
.mobilize or coerce significant numbers of people. Furthermore, within 
the polity members continually test one another; repeated failures of 
partial tests lead to fuller tests which lead, if failed, to exclusion 
from the polity. Each new entry or exit redefines the criteria of 
menbership in a direction favorable to the characteristics of the present 
set of members; the mem.hers tend to hecome attached to those criteria 
as a matter of principle. The life of the polity therefore consists of 
a) the routine application of resources to the influence of the govern- 
ment by members of the polity; b )  attempts by non-memhers (ordinarily 
resisted by members in collaboration with agents of the government) to 
influence the government, including attempts to gain membership; c) an 
ongoing series of con.tests, ranging from parliamentary maneuvering to 
street fighting, among members of the polity'. (Actually a) will fre- 
quently lead to c), as when one member lays claim to resources already 
comnitted to another, and b )  will- frequentlv coincide with c), since 
members often form coalitions with non-members in order to increase 
the resollrces avail-able for application to their common ends .) 
Because of the testfng process by which contenders acquire or 
lose me~qbership, collective violence tends to increase when the member- 
ship of the polity is changing rapidly. Collective violence will pit 
members against me~.bers, and agents of the government (especially 
repressive forces lfke troops and.police) against non-members, but 
rarely non-;?ernhers against non-members, agents of the government against 
members, or agents against each ot5er. In the event of revolution, 
bowever, all these regularities change. 
Revolution, in this political model, consists of the fragmenta- 
tion of a sinsle polity. The case in which the fragmentation turns out 
to be permanent greatly resembles the revolution--indeed, the two cases 
are often indisting~iishahle at the start--but the tern. "revolt" or "civil 
var" applies more easily in that case. Leon Trotsky (1932, 222-230) 
stated t!re essenttals of the fra~rrentati.on years ago, under the heading 
of "dual sovereignty." V?e differ from Trotsky in three ways: 1) in 
claiming that in many revolutions sovereignty is actually multiple, 
rather than dual: 2) in considering it more . . likely that the alternative . . 
polities trill be composed of coalitions of classes -than that they will 
be single classes; 3) in recognizing that the coalitions sometimes in- 
clude groupings which are based on language, religion, region or some 
other  for^ of solidarity than class. 
The fragmentation of the polity can occur in several different 
ways. The most likely is for some new coalition of contenders (at the 
extreme, a single non-member of the polity) to lay claim to exclusive 
control over the government while the remaining established members of 
the polity continue to press their exclusive claims, while some portion 
of the population honors the claims of each of the fragment polities. 
These circumstances may well produce a temporary fragmentation of the 
governrent (as when insurrectionary armies ad.ninister part of a country) 
in addition to the fragm.entation of the polity. In any case, a revolu- 
tion begins when previously acquiescent citizens faced with strictly 
incoapatible demands from the government and an alternative authority 
obey the alternatfve authority. It continues until only one central 
authority remains. 
So far F?e have merely set up a conceptual scheme, embedded in 
a strongly politica1,view of conflict, which contains a few propositions 
so general as not to be amenable to verification in their present form. 
The scheme, nevertk.eless, narrows the search for the causes of revolu- 
tion from the detection of anomie, strain, dysfunction or frustration 
to the specificatfon of the conditions producing the following out- 
cone s : - 
a) appearance of contenders (or coalition of contenders) ad- 
vancinp excl,,isive alternative claims to the control over the 
government currently exerted by members of the polity; 
b) acceptance of those claims by a significant segment of the 
population; 
c) formation of coalitions hetween members of the polity and 
the contenders advancing the alternative claims; 
d) un~rillingness or incapacity of the government to suppress 
the alternative coalition and/or the acceptance of its claims 
(tistorically, t5e unreliability of armed forces has been 
crucial in this regard). 
If these are indeed the constituent elenents of a revolutionary situa- 
tion, they have some interesting implicatfons for the natural history 
of revolution. They give us no particular reason for expecting a 
gradual crescendo of conflict up to the point of revolution, followed 
by a rapid readjustrent, which is the seqnence a tension-release model 
implies. 
On the contrary. A mire reasonable sequence would run: 
1) the gradual mobilization of contenders unacceptable to the 
members of the polity and/or making exclusive claims to govern- 
mental control; 
2) a rapid increase in the number of people accepting those 
claims and/or a rapid expansion of the coalition including the 
unacceptahle or exclusive contenders; 
3) an unsuccessful effort by the government, acting on behalf 
of the members of the polity, to suppress the alternative coali- 
.tion and/or the acceptance of its claims; 
4) establishment by the alternative coalition of effective con- 
trol over some portion of the government; 
5) struggle of the alternative coalition to maintain or ex- 
, .  . . 
tend that control; 
6 )  reconstruction of a single polity through the victory of 
the alternative coalition, through its defeat, or through the 
establishment of a modus vivendi between the alternative coali- 
tion and some or all of the old members. 
It is a matter of pure convenience whether we say dual sovereignty--and 
therefore revolutj.on--commences at stape 2, stage 3, or stage 4, It ends, 
obviously, at stage 6. 
Some Inferences from the Model . 
This "natural. history" of revolution, like those reviewed earlier, 
contains little more than the explication of a definition. It leads, 
however, to some intriguing observations on the sequence of violent con- 
flicts in revolutj.ons. First, the level of conflict is likely to be 
much higher after the first major actions of the revolution than before, 
because the emergence of dual sovereignty challenges the position of 
every member of the polity, and thus besins a major round of testing. 
Second, the struggle between the two polities is itself likely 
to produce a polarized forn. of conflict, activating an exceptional pro- 
?ortion of the population on one side or another. 
. Third, the successful revolutionary coalition--whichever com- 
bination of tFLe original contenders it contains--is likely to face con- 
siderable resistance as it attempts to reestablish routine governmental 
control over the population as a whole after seizing the governmental 
apparatus. To the extent tllat the revolutionary action begins with the 
seizure of a crucial but narrow geographical and/or organizational part 
of the apparatus, the struggle is likely to shift away from that locus 
a f t e r  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  conso l ida t e  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  t h e r e .  I n  geo- 
g r a p h i c a l l y  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  s t a t e s - l i k e  those  of t h e  
modern West, revol l l t ionary  c o n f l i c t s  are most l i k e l y  t o  o r i g i n a t e  a t  t h e  
c e n t e r  and then  s h i f t  t o  t h e  pe r iphe ry  i f  t h e  c e n t e r  i s  won. 
Fouft!l, t h e  i n i t i a l  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  frag-  
ment, l eav ing  a  few contenders  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  powerful,  f o r  s e v e r a l  
reasons:  a )  t h e  i n f t i e l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  r e q u i r e s  a l a r g e r  c o a l i t i o n  
than  does t h e  maintenance of c o n t r o l :  b) t h e  divergence of t h e  longer- 
run o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  Eo312sced coiifendGSS is l i k e l y  t o  become more 
s a l i e n t  and s e r i o u s  a f t e r  tlie i i i i t i a i  e f f o r t  of d i s lodg ing  t h e  previous 
p o l i t y  from c o n t r o l  i s  p a s t :  c )  t hose  cbntenders  which have mobilized 
r a p i d l y  i n  response t o  short-run c r i s e s  b u t  which remain r e l a t i v e l y  
underorganized a r e  a l s o  l i k e l v  t o  demobi l ize  - more r a p i d l y  than  o t h e r  
contenders ,  and thus  t6 lode  ~ 6 5 l t i o n  i n  t i e  t e s t i n g  whiCEi immediately 
fo l lows  t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r 6  of povTer. On t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  c o a l i t i o n  
t h e o r i s t s  (e .  p. , Cole6idn 1973, Gamson 1~68a, Sche l l i ng  1973) have a l -  
ready suggested soBe proniisfnp liypdtfieses. 
Tes t ing  t h e  Model 
T h o u ~ h  easy t o  s t a t e ,  t h e s e  i d e a s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  tes t - - for  
they  r e q u i r e  a  for-  of d a t a  ~ u c h  ha rde r  t o  assemble than  t h e  ba ld  r e c i -  
t a t i o n  of even t s  which fue ls  the n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  argumects. Needed f o r  
t h i s  " p o l i t i c a l  process"  model of r evo lu t iona ry  change a r e  d a t a  which 
r e l a t e  t h e  manifest  c o n f l i c t s  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  segments 
of t h e  base populatLon be fo re ,  dur ing  and a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  even t s ,  
v i a  an  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  changing a c t i o n s  and r e l a t i o n s  of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
contenders  f o r  power. These n a t e r i a l s  must be ga thered  i n  such a  way 
,- 
a s  t o  view events  t r a n s p i r i n q  be fo re ,  dur ing  and a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t ion  
with  t h e  same a n a l y t i c a l  l e n s ,  s o  a s  t o  avoid t h e  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  f a l l a c y  
of "working backward" from t h e  acconplished f a c t  o f - r e v o l u t i o n a r y  change 
i n  o r d e r  t o  i d e n t i f y  s t a g e s  which "had" t o  l ead  t o  r evo lu t ion .  Such d a t a  
a r e  a thousand t imes  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  assemble than  a r e  s t r a igh t fo rward  
accounts  of t h e  p r i n c i p a l  events .  The c o l l e c t i o n  of t h e  information on 
which we s h a l l  drat7 i.n t h e  fol lowing a n a l y s i s  took seven y e a r s  of t h e  
time of good-sized r e sea rch  teams a t  Harvard, Toronto and Michigan. 
Even t h a t  in format ion  f a i l s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  d i r e c t l y  s e v e r a l  c r u c i a l  p a r t s  
of t h e  processes  of mobi . l izat ion,  con ten t ion  and t r a n s f e r  of power t h a t  
1.7e have been d i scuss ing .  Despi te  a number of t r i a l s ,  we have no t  so  
f a r  been a b l e  t o  develop a r e l i a b l e  procedure f o r  enumerating contenders ,  
measuring t h e i r  mobilization and c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  
t h e  e x i s t l n g  s t r u c t u r e  of pox,7er which i s  t r u l y  independent of t h e  con- 
f l i c t s  we a r e  atteinptinp, t o  exp la in .  The p o r t i o n s  of t h e  argument w e  
a r e  i n  t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  t o  t e s t  d i r e c t l y  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  those  ' dea l ing  
with t h e  t1rni.n~ and personnel  o f '  v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s .  
The d a t a  c o n s i s t  c h i e f l v  of coded, machine-readahle accounts  of 
every v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t  a5ove a c e r t a i n  s c a l e  occu r r ing  i n  France noted 
by t r a i n e d  r e a d e r s  scanning ti,-o n a t i o n a l  d a i l y  newspapers f o r  each day 
over t h e  pe r iods  from 183n through 1860 and 1930 through 1960, p l u s  a 
random t h r e e  months per  year  over  t h e  per iod  from 1851 through 1929. 
Inforr!>ation on t h e s e  even t s  i s  drawn n o t  only from t h e  o r i g i n a l  news- 
paper a c c o ~ m t s ,  bu t  a l s o  from a r c h i v a l  sources  and secondary h i s t o r i c a l  
n a t e r i a l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  f u r t h e r  d a t a  c o n s i s t  of machine-readable des- 
c r i p t i o n s  of a wide v a r i e t v  of s o c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s  year  by yea r  f o r  t h e  
86 t o  90 Frenc!~ dGpartern.ents and f o r  France a s  a whole. 
A "v io l en t  event , "  f o r  t h e s e  purposes,  is a cont inuous i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  between tuo  o r  more foma t ions ,  o r  between one formation and 
t h e  p rope r ty  of ano the r ,  i n  which a t  l e a s t  one formation has  f i f t y  o r  
more p a r t i c i p a n t s  and i n  t h e  course  of \\rhich - a t  l e a s t  one formatton 
s e i z e s  o r  damages persons o r  o b j e c t s .  (Acts of w a r  between s t a t e s ,  
however, a r e  excluded.)  The £01-lowing r e p o r t ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  s o r t  
of in format ion  being analysed.  It d e s c r i b e s  even t s  which took p l ace  i n  
t h e  s o u t h e r n  French c i t y  of Carcassonne i n  March, 1832. 
The d i s tu rbance  whj.ch a f f l i c t e d  t h i s  commune on t h e  e igh th  
of  t h i s  month bro1:e out  aga in  yes te rday  (Sunday), w i t h  even 
p r e a t e r  v io l ence .  The i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  Bishop on support-  
/ 
i ng  t h e  i n t e r d j - c t i o n  of Fa ther  ~ a t a i l l g ,  t h e  p a r i s h  p r i e s t ,  
and t h e  presence  of o t h e r  p r i e s t s  s e n t  t o  Saint-Vincent 
p a r i s h  t o  conduct t h e  Sunday s e r v i c e s ,  brought f o r t h  a  
l a r g e  cro\\ld i n  t h e  church, and t h e  p r i e s t s  were chased from 
t h e  premises .  The P r e f e c t ,  who on t h e  e i g h t h  had r e fused  
t o . c a l l  I n  t h e  Natiorzal Suard t o  d i s p e r s e  t h e  crowd, took 
r ecour se  t o  t h e  Gus-rc! on t h i s  occas ion ,  d e c l i n i n g  t o  c a l l  
i n  t h e  r e g u l a r  army f o r  f e a r  of c r e a t i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  antag- 
. onism. 
Thus t!le Nat iona l  Guard asse9bled  a t  Canal Square. The 
Guard would have succeeded i n  calming t h e  d i s tu rbance ,  
except  f o r  t h e  presence of t h e  P r e f e c t ,  t h e  General and 
s e v e r a l  municipal  o f f i c i a l s .  The s i g h t  of t h e s e  brought 
t h e  crowd t o  new excesses .  The crowd j ee red  t h e  P r e f e c t ,  
t h r e a t e n i n g  t o  throw h i n  i n  t h e  c a n a l ,  and forced  him t o  
f l e e  t o  t h e  s i d e  of t h e  General ,  A h a i l  of s tones  thrown 
at the officials by the crowd struck the General on the 
head and the deputy mayor on the face. The -latter later 
submitted his resignation. The crowd then became still 
more threatening. Four officers of the Guard left their 
troops to harangue the crowd, with some effect. "We'll 
obey you," cried some of the pincipal residents of the 
Carcassonne, "for you are good patriots." The crowd 
dispersed. Calm returned, and the night passed quietly. 
.Now that these deplorable events have occurred, the 
Bishop and the Prefect can no longer do us any good: 
their presence alone creates general antagonism.and 
ferment. The most peaceable and respectable citizens 
are hurrying to sign a petition to the legislature seek- 
in? the removal of the Prefect and the transfer of the 
Bishop. 
The authorities have been astonished at the moral author- 
ity over the crowds shown by the National Guard. . . 
(Le - Constltutionnel, March 19, 1832). 
Some of the available accounts are.more detailed than this one, a major- 
ity of then sketchier,* Taken together, the approximately 1,400 dis- 
turbance reports frox 1839 through 1900 constitute a comprehensive 
sample of events in which people were sufficiently committed to their 
objectives to take violent action, plus information on the contexts of 
the events. 
"On the basis of this-report and two others, all drawn from - Le
Constitutionne~, our coders estimated the total number of participants 
at 400 to 600, and hroke then into two formations: one a "crowd of 
common ideology" and the other one a National Guard plus public officials. 
Our procedure yields, so far as we can tell, a more representa- 
tive sample of violent conflicts tfian would reliance on standard his- 
tories or on any combination of major series of documents available to 
French historians for the period in question. Yet it tends to under- 
represent areas and segnents of the population which are either less 
accessible or less interesting to jotirnalists. This bias is probably 
greater in tines of crisis at the center, which draw attention away 
from the rest of the world. 
Yet the general bias is endemic, and probably constant over 
short periods. The metllod aDpears to capture the general fluctuation 
of conflict over tine fairly well. A comparison between the number 
of violent events in the sample and those mentioned in the inventories 
of two of the standard archival series on the internal policing of 
France (Archives Vationales ~11'~ and  BE^') yields the following num- 
bers of disturbances by quarter from 1830 through 1832: 
1830 1831 1832 
1 2 2 4  1 2 3 4  - 1 2 3 5  - TOTAL 
sample 2 5 25 18 9 4 7 3  17 42 7 2 141 
archive . 5 1 47 17 1 5 4 4 4  9121'0 7 135 
The comparison is weakened somewhat by the inventories' imprecision 
concerning the number of participants and the extent of violence in the 
smaller conflicts and by their tendency to lump together a number of 
related events (notably the multiple counter-revolutionary movements in 
the West during the second quarter of 1832) into a single item. But in 
general the swings in frequencies correspond to those of our sample 
(r = .52). For that reason, it may be useful to extend the series back 
a few years in time via the archival materials: 
1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 - - - - - - -  
sample -- -- -- -- 50 23 - 68 
archive  1 3  11 1 3  22 70 27 3 8 
The counts show a much h igher  frequency of c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence  immediately 
a f t e r  t h e  r evo lu t ion  than i n  the  years  before ,  d e s p i t e  the  accumulation 
of a c e r t a i n  number of food r i o t s  i n  1829. The observat ion,  which i s  
re in fo rced  by t h e  q u a r t e r l y  count presented above, w i l l  t ake  on some 
importance l a t e r .  
A s  we completed our enumeration of v i o l e n t  events  meeting our 
c r i t e r i a ,  we coded them extens ive ly  i n  a uniform manner. That involved 
breaking the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  each event i n t o  "formations1'--sets of per- 
sons a c t i n g  together--and descr ib ing  each fokmation's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
and a c t i o n s  sepa ra te ly ,  a s  we l l  a s  cha rac te r i z ing  t h e  s e t t i n g  and t h e  
event a s  a whole. The i tems coded ranged from mul t ip l e  measures of t h e  
s c a l e  of the  event t o  d e t a i l e d  sequences of a c t i o n  f o r  ind iv idua l  forma- 
t i o n s  t o  manifes t  ob jec t ives  of the  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  I n  t h i s  r epor t ,  
however, we draw only on our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  of formations and our 
es t imates  of the  number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  each event .  
Here we analyze only one small  segment of the  sample: The v i o l e n t  
events  recorded from t h e  years  1830, 1831, 1832. Those events  inc lude  
a l l  t h e  l a r g e r  v i o l e n t  encounters which were p a r t  of t h e  Revolution of 
1830, bu t  they a l s o  inc lude  a number of small  i n c i d e n t s  t o  which h is -  
t o r i a n s  have not  a t t r i b u t e d  any p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  s ign i f i cance .  
Inc lus iveness  i s  a v i r t u e ,  f o r  i t  permits  us t o  s tudy how t h e  occurrence 
of r evo lu t ion  a f f e c t s  t h e  whole p a t t e r n  of v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t .  
The Revolution of 1830 - -- 
The "Three Glorious Days" of Ju ly ,  1830, brought about a popular 
overthrow of entrenched power, one which s p e l l e d  t h e  d e f i n i t i v e  end of  
t h e  Bourbon monarchy i n  France and l e d  t o  a sweeping- change i n  t h e  per- 
sonnel  of t h e  government's upper echelons.  ( I n  our  gene ra l  a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  con tex t ,  we r e l y  e s p e c i a l l y  on t h e  fo l lowing  accounts:  Aguet 
(1954), Dolleans (1967),  Cheval ier  (1958), Labrousee (n.d.) ,  Mantoux 
(1901), Gi rard  (1961), Lhomme (1960), and Pinkney (1964 and 1972). I n  
p l ace  of t h e  Bourbon Charles  X, t h e  Revo lu t ion . e l eva t ed  Louis-Philippe 
of Orleans t o  t h e  throne--not a s  King of France, b u t  as "King of  t h e  
French." The r e v o l u t i o n  changed t h e  c a s t  o f  French p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  
b r ing ing  France one s t e p  c lose r  t o  par l iamentary  democracy. Nor d id  
t h e s e  changes come wi thout  bloodshed. I n  t h e  course  of t h e  "Three 
Glor ious  ~ a y s "  of f i g h t i n g  between i n s u r g e n t s  and. t h e  army i n  t h e  s t r e e t s  
of P a r i s ,  some two thousand Frenchmen l o s t  t h e i r  l i v e s .  
The Revolution of 1830 d id  no t  e x c i t e  t h e  popular  involvement of 
1848. It d i d  not  accomplish the  sweeping rearrangements of 1789. Its 
rank and f i l e  d i d  not  s h a r e  t he  single-minded commitment t o  a revolu- 
t i o n a r y  program of t h e  Communards of 1871. It was no l e s s  a r evo lu t ion  
f o r  a l l  t h a t .  I n  ou r  view, t h e  e f f o r t  t o  s i n g l e  out  a c l a s s  of "true" 
r e v o l u t i o n s  through t h e  ex tens iveness  of popular  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  t h e  
depth  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  changes r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  power o r  
t h e  r ad i ca l i sm of t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  d e f e a t s  i t s e l f .  It 
makes c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  phenomenon t o  b e  examined j u s t  
those  f e a t u r e s  which a r e  ha rdes t  t o  d e t e c t ,  and which ought t o  be 
t r e a t e d  a s  v a r i a b l e s .  It  makes v i r t u a l l y  impossible  what is  a l r eady  a 
very  d i f f i c u l t  t ask :  ana lyz ing  what d i s t i n g u i s h e s  those  t r a n s f e r s  of 
c o n t r o l  over governments which do invo lve  massive popular  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  -
and widespread s t r u c t u r a l  change from those  which-do no t .  Employing t h e  
. . more s t r i c t l y  p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  of m u l t i p l e  sovere ignty  makes i t  c l e a r  
. .  . .. : 
t h a t  1830 brought  France a genuine r evo lu t ion .  Once we examine 1830 
o u t s i d e  t h e  shadows of 1789 and 1848, moreover, we can s e e  we l l  enough 
t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  0.f power were f a r  more ex tens ive  than  appears  a t  f i r s t  
glance.  * 
Who took p a r t ?  Who were t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y  on t h e  eve. 
of t he  r e v o l u t i o n ,  who t h e  contenders  t e s t i n g  one another  i n  t h e  revolu- 
t i o n a r y  and pos t - revolu t ionary  power s t r u g g l e s ?  Jean  Lhomme's summary 
i s  convenient:  F i r s t ,  t h e  backers  of Char les  X, t h e  mst powerful group 
up t o  t h e    evolution; Lhomme s e e s  them a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  landed 
a r i s t o c r a c y  . Second, poised a g a i n s t  t h i s  group, another  p r iv i l eged  
element: a c o u n t e r - e l i t e  composed of t h e  upper b,ourgeoisie,  wi th  
a c t i v i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  t he  Chamber o f  Deputies ,  t h e  p r e s s  and o the r  
key p o s i t i o n s .  I n  terms of t h e  conceptua l  scheme we a r e  employing, both 
these  groups count: 2s rnernbers of t h e  p o l i t y ;  t h e r e  a r e ,  of course,  o t h e r s ,  
b u t  they ma t t e r  l e s s  f o r  t h e  p re sen t  a n a l y s i s .  Another two groups iden- 
t i f i e d  by Lhomme a s  a c t i v e  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e s t s  of t h i s  per iod  were 
t h e  numerous urban working classes--poor,  i n a r t i c u l a t e ,  and badly 
organized,  b u t  s t i l l  capable of some degree  of  c o l l e c t i v e  action--and 
t h e  r u r a l  poor,  d e s t i t u t e  a s  t h e i r  urban coun te rpa r t s  b u t  d i f f e r e n t  i n  
p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n .  These l a t t e r  groups were a c t i v e  contenders  i n  t h e  
power s t r u g g l e  dur ing  t h e  yea r s  under s tudy ,  bu t  were excluded by t h e  
f i r s t  two from membership i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t y .  
These rough c a t e g o r i e s  s imp l i fy  enormously a r i c h ,  complex c l a s s  
s t r u c t u r e .  For most purposes,  a c l a s s  a n a l y s t  of t h i s  per iod would want 
*For a f u l l e r  d i scuss ion  on t h i s  p o i n t ,  s e e  Pinkney (1972, Chapter 
1x1. 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  expanding c l a s s  of small manufacturers  from t h e  world 
of smal l  craf tsmen and shopkeepers which suppl ied  s o  many of t h e  revolu- 
t i o n a r y  a c t i v i s t s  from 1789 t o  1848, t h e  t r u e  peasants  from t h e  a g r i c u l -  
t u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  t h e  f a c t o r y  workers from t h e  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o r e r s ,  and s o  
on. These d i s t i n c t i o n s  m a t t e r  a  g r e a t  d e a l  t o  our  more r e f i n e d  t r e a t -  
ments of n ine t een th  century  c o n f l i c t s .  For p re sen t  purposes,  they would 
simply obscure t h e  gene ra l  argument. 
Our c a t e g o r i e s ,  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  crudeness ,  t a k e  u s  a  g i a n t  s t e p  
toward a  more s u b t l e  understanding of  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  events  them- 
s e l v e s ;  a l though r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  groups a l l  had 
t h e i r  r o l e s  t o  p lay  i n  t h e  Three Glor ious  Days, they  were d i f f e r e n t  r o l e s  
indeed. The Revolut ion came a f t e r  a  per iod  of smoldering i f  u n s p i r i t e d  
c o n f l i c t  between t h e  government and t h e  bourgeois  coun te r - e l i t e .  The 
immediate spu r  t o  a c t i o n  came on J u l y  25 when t h e  government, f a c i n g  a 
d e f e a t  from i t s  a n t a g o n i s t s  i n  t h e  Chamber of Deputies,  promulgated a 
s e r i e s  of measures suspending freedom of t h e  p r e s s ,  d i s s o l v i n g  t h e  
r e c e n t l y  e l e c t e d  Chamber, and r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  f r anch i se .  The parliamen- 
t a r y  opposi t ion-- the bourgeois  counter -e l i te - -ca l led  on t h e  n a t i o n  t o  
r e s i s t ,  p o s t i n g  p l aca rds  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  throughout P a r i s .  Perhaps more 
important ,  t h e  oppos i t i on  p r e s s  c losed  down i n  response t o  t h e  govern- 
ment 's measures, sending t h e  p r i n t e r s  and o t h e r  workers i n t o  t h e  s t r e e t s .  
News and a g i t a t i o n  spread through t h e  e x i s t i n g  networks of neighborhood, 
work and l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza t ion .  By J u l y  27 b a r r i c a d e s  had 
appeared i n  t h e  c i ty- -espec ia l ly  i n  t h e  o l d  working-class neighborhoods-- 
and f i g h t i n g  between in su rgen t s  and t h e  army had begun. By t h e  29th, 
t h e  cha l l enge r s  had won t h e  day. The k ing  abdica ted  and f l e d  t h e  country; 
t h e  Duke of Orleans was i n s t a l l e d  i n  h i s  p lace .  Three s h o r t  days 
s u f f i c e d  t o  depose the  l a s t  of t h e  Bourbons and sh i f - t  t h e  r e i n s  of power. 
We recount  t h e  even t s  p a r t l y  t o  emphasize t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  which e f f e c t e d  t h e  overthrow. The bases  f o r  a c t i o n  on the  
p a r t  of t h e  working-class cha l l enge r s  and t h e  bourgeois  members of t h e  
p o l i t y  were q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  David Pinkney's  work on t h e  P a r i s  revolu- 
t i o n  of 1830 has  shown t h a t  t he  d i s p a r i t i e s  were so  g r e a t  t h a t  unanimity 
(however one might reckon i t )  was impossible .  Pinkney argues ,  f o r  
example, t h a t  t h e  working-class crowd were uninvolved i n  t h e  q u a r r e l  
between t h e  government and i t s  e l i t e  an t agon i s t s :  
. . . thousands of P a r i s  workingmen during t h e  dep res s ion  
y e a r s  of t h e  l a t e  1820s and e a r l y  1830s h.ad s p e c i f i c  
grievances--lack of work, low wages, t h e  h igh  p r i c e  of 
bread--that had noth ing  t o  do w i t h  t h e  d i s p u t e  over  censorsh ip  
t h a t  a l i e n a t e d  t h e  p r i n t e r s  and j o u r n a l i s t s  from t h e  
Pol ignac min i s t ry .  (1964, p. 2) 
The convent ional  way t o  d e a l  wi th  t h i s  d i screpancy  h a s  been t o  t r e a t  t h e  
workers as impelled,  r a t h e r  b l i n d l y ,  by hardship ;  Pinkney's  a n a l y s i s ,  
however, makes i t  e a s i e r  t o  s e e  t h a t  a genuine c o a l i t i o n  of  groups wi th  
r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  o b j e c t i v e s  was a t  work i n  t h e  e a r l y  r evo lu t ion .  The 
n a t u r e  of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  adds i rony  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l though few bourgeois  
d ied  i n  t h e  P a r i s i a n  events  i n  comparison t o  t h e  t e r r i b l e  t o l l  of workers, 
t he  upper bourgeois  picked up t h e  p i eces ,  s e t  t h e  c a s t  of t h e  new govern- 
ment and occupied t h e  s t a t i o n s  of power w i t h i n  i t .  
This  account of t h e  P a r i s  days a l s o  provides  another  ground f o r  
skept ic i sm about  t hose  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  t h e o r i e s  of r e v o l u t i o n  which 
i m p l i c i t l y  p o s i t  a s i n g l e  s t a t e  of mind o r  shared t e n s i o n  through e n t i r e  
popula t ions .  For t h e  a c t u a l  change i n  government w a s  accomplished both 
i n  a remarkably s h o r t  time and through t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a s m a l l  
segment of t h e  French populace: perhaps twenty thousand par t ic ipants - -  
less than  a  hundredth of one percent--of a n a t i o n  of twenty-five mi l l i on .  
Ce r t a in ly  t h e s e  twenty thousand people were i n  a s t r a t e g i c  l oca t ion .  
Ce r t a in ly  many o t h e r  non-combatant Frenchmen shared  a t  l e a s t  some of 
t h e i r  ou t look .  But on ly  t h e  r a s h e s t  observer  could au toma t i ca l ly  
a s c r i b e  t h e  pe rcep t ions ,  gr ievances and d e s i r e s  of those  who fought t o  
t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  populace. A minor i ty  of a  s p e c i f i c  c l a s s  i n  a s i n g l e  
c i t y  were a b l e  t o  d i s lodge  t h e  Bourbon regime from i t s  p o s i t i o n  of 
power. To s t a k e  one ' s  explana t ion  of t h e  change of government on what 
t h e  r e s t  of t h e  French n a t i o n  was th ink ing  o r  f e e l i n g  seems t o  us  
unwarranted and r i s k y .  
In s t ead ,  t h e  model of r evo lu t ion  a l r e a d y  presented  d i r e c t s  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  form, locus  and i n t e n s i t y  of c o n f l i c t  a s  t h e  
s t r u g g l e  f o r  power cont inues .  I f  t h e  model i s  c o r r e c t ,  w e  should expect  
t o  f i nd :  
1 )  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n f l i c t  a f t e r  t h e  
i n c e p t i o n  of t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  a s  a )  t h e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power 
over  t h e  c e n t r a l  governmental appa ra tus  gene ra l i ze s ;  b )  a l l  
contenders  f i n d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y -  open t o  
t e s t  and change; c )  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  which acqu i r e s  c o n t r o l  
over  t h e  c e n t e r  a t tempts  t o  reimpose c o n t r o l  over t h e  
p e r i p h e r a l  segments of t h e  popula t ion  as a whole; 
2) a  movement of c o n f l i c t  toward t h e  c e n t e r s  of power 
a s  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  begins,  and toward t h e  pe r iphe ry  as i t  
proceeds t o  re impos i t ion  of c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  over t h e  
remainder of  t h e  populat ion;  
. - 
3)  a n  increased  use  of s p e c i a l i z e d  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  a s  
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  c o n s o l i d a t e s  i t s  c o n t r o l  over 
t h e  c e n t e r ,  demobilized some of t h e  contenders  which took 
an  a c t i v e  p a r t ' i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of power, and 
extends i ts  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  per iphery ;  
4) a genera l  " p o l i t i c i z a t i o n "  o f  c o n f l i c t  w i th  and a f t e r  
t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  a s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
s i t u a t i o n  encourages a l l  contenders  t o  t e s t  each o t h e r  
i n  o rde r  t o  main ta in  o r  aggrandize  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s ,  and as 
every c o n f l i c t  comes to ,have  some s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  p o l i t y  t o  emerge from t h e  r evo lu t ion ;  
5) a gene ra l  tendency f o r  bo th  t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and t h e  
i n t e n s i t y  of c o n f l i c t s  t o  vary  as a d i r e c t  func t ion  of 
t h e  proximity of d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  popula t ion  
t o  t h e  cen te r .  
Now, these  in fe rences  from our gene ra l  scheme obviously assume a h igh ly  
c e n t r a l i z e d  government; they very  l i k e l y  draw some of t h e i r  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
from t h e i r  f i t  wi th  what we a l r eady  know t o  be t h e  common run  of modern 
European experience.  The peasant  wars s o  powerful ly  analyzed by Er i c  
Wolf (1969),  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, w i l l  on ly  f i t  t h e s e  s ta tements  a f t e r  some 
. -. - i tugging and squeezing. We claim only  t h a t  t hese  a r e  reasonable  i n fe rences  - i7<: 
8 -: , - 
from our  argument t o  t h e  s o r t s  of c e n t r a l i z e d  governments modern Europe 
d id  produce, and t h e r e f o r e  t o  t h e  p o l i t i e s  which have suppl ied  t h e o r i s t s  
of r e v o l u t i o n  wi th  most of t h e i r  c l a s s i c  cases ,  and t h a t  "na tu ra l  
h i s  tory" schemes e i t h e r  provide no i n f e r e n c e s  regard ing  t h e s e  ma t t e r s  o r  
sugges t  con t r a ry  ones.  
The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
A s  p re l iminary  t e s t s  of t h e s e  a s s e r t i o n s ,  le-t us  examine da t a  
concerning t h e  timing, locus  and p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  
w i t h i n  France from 1830 through 1832. F i r s t ,  t iming.  F igure  1 d i s p l a y s  
t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v i o l e n c e  by q u a r t e r  from January 1830 
t o  December 1832, i n  terms o f  numbers of v i o l e n t  events  and es t imated  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  them. (The e s t ima t ing  procedure a )  g ives  precedence t o  
s p e c i f i c  numbers r epo r t ed  i n  t h e  accounts  used, b)  permi ts  t h e  coder t o  
draw in fe rences  from t h e  t e r r i t o r y  occupied by t h e  v i o l e n t  event ,  t he  
number of a r r e s t s  and c a s u a l t i e s  and t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  words used by 
wi tnes ses ,  c )  a s s igns  t o  t hose  v i o l e n t  events  f o r  which t h e r e  is  too  
l i t t l e  in format ion  t o  make even t h a t  s o r t  of judgment--in t h i s  ca se  8 
of t he  141  dis turbances-- the mean v a l u e  of t h e  e s t ima te s  f o r  o t h e r  
d i s tu rbances  i n  t h e  same q u a r t e r . )  On t h e  whole, t h e  curves of  v i o l e n t  
events  and of p a r t i c i p a n t s  move toge the r .  The l a r g e s t  except ion  i n  t h e  
t h r e @  y e a r s  i s  the' t h i r d  q u a r t e r  of 1831, dur ing  which t h e  number of 
v i o l e n t  events  dec l ined  t o  t h r e e ,  b u t  t h e  famous November i n s u r r e c t i o n  
i n  Lyon brought t he  p a r t i c i p a n t s  up t o  over  seventeen thousand. The 
graph a l s o  d i s p l a y s  t h e  gene ra l  tendency f o r  t h e  average s i z e  of  v i o l e n t  
events  t o  r i s e  i n  t imes of widespread c o n f l i c t  l i k e  Ju ly  1830 and June 
1832. 
Perhaps the  most remarkable t h ing  shown i n  these  curves is t h e  
r e l a t i v e  quiescence of  France dur ing  t h e  six-month per iod  immediately 
p r i o r  t o  t h e  r evo lu t ion .  From t h e  f i r s t  of January t o  t h e  end of June .  
1830, we d iscover  a  t o t a l  of seven v i o l e n t  events .  During t h e  f i v e  
months from t h e  beginningaf  August t o  t h e  end of t h e  year ,  however, 
t h e r e  a r e  a t o t a l  of t h i r t y - f i v e .  This  accords badly wi th  those  n a t u r a l  
Figure 1: Number of Disturbances and Estimated Participants i n  
Disturbances by Quarter, 1830 to 1832 
Number of disturbances 
----------------- Estimated number of participants 
(thousands) -. 
h i s t o r y  t h e o r i e s  which p o s i t  a  gradual  build-up of excitement o r  t ens ion  
during t h e  pre- revolu t ionary  per iod ,  fol lowed by a  down- t u r n  and genera l  
subsidence once t h e  r evo lu t ion  is  accomplished. Indeed, P a r i s  i t s e l f ,  
t h e  s i t e  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  and t h e  a r e a  where t h e  d a t a  on d i s tu rbances  
a r e  most complete, shows no v io l ence  above our  minimum s c a l e  between t h e  
f i r s t  of t h e  year  and t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  days. Nor do 1831 and 1832 show 
much of a ' s y s t e m a t i c  decrescendo of v io l ence  o r  homeostat ic  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
e a r l i e r  equi l ibr ium.  1831, i t  is  t r u e ,  i s  cons iderably  l e s s  v i o l e n t  than  
t h e  second h a l f  of 1830, y e t  1831 remains more v i o l e n t  than  t h e  f i r s t  
s i x  months of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  year .  And 1832, though l i k e w i s e  showing 
a  lower inc idence  of v io l ence  per  month than  t h e  last  h a l f  of 1830, 
neve r the l e s s  shows more than twice a s  many i n c i d e n t s  as 1831 and many 
more per  month than  t h e  pre- revolu t ionary  per iod  of 1830. Indeed, an  
examination of ou r  sample shows t h a t  1832 produced t h e  g r e a t e s t  number 
of v i o l e n t  i n d e n t s  of any year  dur ing  t h e  1830-1860 per iod .  By any 
reckoning, t h e  "Three .Glorious ~ a y s "  of J u l y ,  1830, mark the  beginning, 
r a t h e r  than  t h e  climax, of a  t u rbu len t  pe r iod  i n  French h i s t o r y .  
A c l o s e r  -look a t  t h e  i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  months a f t e r  t h e  revolu- 
t i o n  i n  1830 shows a s t i l l . m o r e  i n t e r e s t i n g  p a t t e r n  of  development of 
r evo lu t iona ry  v io l ence .  The r e v o l u t i o n  i t s e l f  had played o u t  w i t h i n  a  
remarkably s h o r t  per iod  of time. Within f i v e  days of t h e ' f i r s t  s i g n s  
of popular h o s t i l i t y  t o  t h e  regime i n  P a r i s ,  and a f t e r  j u s t  t h r e e  days 
of f i g h t i n g ,  t h e  Bourbon monarchy f e l l  f o r  good; g iven  t h e  s t a t e  of 
communications a t  t h a t  time, t he  r e v o l u t i o n  was a n  accomplished f a c t  
be fo re  most of t h e  country had heard about  i t .  Yet t h e  rees tab l i shment  
of s i n g l e  sovere ignty  through France a s  a  whole took months.* Most of  
*At t h i s  p o i n t  our  d i scuss ion  has b e n e f i t t e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  from David 
Pinkney (1971, pe r sona l  communication; and 1972). 
t h e  major c i t i e s  of France were t h e  scenes  of sympathet ic  responses as 
soon a s  news of t h e  P a r i s i a n  i n s u r r e c t i o n  reached them. I n  Nantes, f o r  
example : 
The J u l y  Ordinances were knam t h e  morning of t h e  29th. They 
had a powerful impact. Fee l ings  r a n  h igh  a l l  day and 
d i s o r d e r l y  crowds gathered i n  f r o n t  of t h e  t h e a t e r  t h a t  
evening. The gendarmes and t h e  s o l d i e r s  of t h e  Tenth Line 
Regiment in te rvened  and r e s t o r e d  o rde r .  F i f t e e n  demonstra- 
t o r s  wer.e a r r e s t e d  and taken t o  t h e  ch6teau.  
The next  morning, t h e r e  was g r e a t  a g i t a t i o n ,  and i t  spread 
t o  t h e  masses. The merchants and t h e  upper bourgeo i s i e  
d i d  no t  h i d e  t h e i r  f e a r s .  They asked for,  t h e  r e e s t a b l i s h -  
ment of t h e  Nat iona l  Guard, b u t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i d  no t  
seem i n c l i n e d  t o  l i s t e n  t o  them. 
The mayor w a s  s t r o n g l y  urged. . . t o  f r e e  t h e  demonstrators  
who had been imprisoned i n  t h e  ChGteau t h e  n i g h t  befdre .  
He s a i d  a l l  he could do was speak t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  commander. 
Af t e r  t h a t  r e p l y ,  a group formed and headed f o r  t h e  
headquar te rs  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  d i v i s i o n ,  grew along t h e  
way, and included a hundred-odd persons when i t  got  t o  
t h e  P lace  Louis XVI .  There i t  found a detachment of t h e  
Tenth i n  b a t t l e  formation b e f o r e  t h e  headquar te rs .  I n  
t h e  midst of t h e  shouts  and imprecat ions of  t h e  crowd, 
someone f i r e d  a gun. The s o l d i e r s  responded wi th  a 
vo l l ey .  The demonstrators  f l e d ,  w i th  seven of  them s h o t  
t o  dea th  and some f o r t y  of them more o r  l e s s  s e r i o u s l y  
wounded. 
The populace invaded the guard house and disarmed the 
soldiers on duty there. The military authorities lim-. 
. . 
ited their action to securing the ch8teau;and the Place . 
Louis XVI, and the city was abandoned to itself. Some 
citizens who had ket at the Bourse during the day or- 
ganized patrols which walked the city that night and 
maintained order. 
The members of the court and the Chamber of Commerce 
took the initiative in reestablishing the National Guard 
and a~pealed to the loyalty of their fellow citizens in 
a notice posted Saturday, July 31. ~ecause 0f.a delay 
in the mails, only'on the night of August'l did people 
leam the departure of Charles X and the establishment' 
of a provisional government. The Prefect and the mayor, 
considering the game lost, left the city on the 2nd: that . 
night general ~espinois, taking part of his garrison with 
him, headed for the Vendge, hoping to raise an insurrection 
there. The National Guard organized. Lt. General Dumoutier, 
who lived near the city, took command. 
Mayet,.senior ,member of the prefectoral council, took over- 
direction of departmental affairs on the 3rd. On the 4th, 
the official news finally-came. The tricolor flag went up; 
On the 6th, Dumoutier took command of the Twelfth Division. 
. . 
(~ibaudisre 1905, 81-83: a far superior account, too long 
to quote here, appears in Giraud-Mangin). 
Between the time of the revolution in Paris and August 4, similar 
events broke out in Toulouse, Bordeaux, Lille, Amiens and Dijon. All of 
these incidents represented assertions of strength by local 
representatives of the forces who had seized power.in Paris. In terms 
of our political process model of revolution, these events represented 
the first of a series of tests among various members of the polity and 
contenders for political power to determine the concrete power relations 
which would result from the revolutionary change at the center. 
These essentially urban events played themselves out almost 
immediately after the revolution, even though the overall level of 
violence hit another peak before the end of the year. Inflating the 
,rates. during the remainder of 18'30 were another kind of violent con- 
frontation, one pitting a different combination of parties against 
one another in a different kind of mutual testing. These were out- 
. . 
breaks .of attacks against the agents and symbols of central control. 
Particularly favored for such attacks were the taxation offices by 
which Paris collected its much-detested internal taxes and which cut 
the income of local farmers while raising the level of food prices in 
the cities and towns. For example, an account of a tax riot in the 
Champagne city of Epernay in December, 1830 begins: 
Six hundred wine growers descended on the house of the 
collector of excise, sacked his offices, seized his record 
books, and burned them in the square by the city hall. 
(Archives Hationales B8l8 1191). 
and then goes on to give details: The presences of women and children 
in the crowd, the refusal of part of the National Guard (themselves re- 
cruited from the winegrowers) to act against their brothers, the request 
for troops f.rom outside, the dispersal of the rioters, Another account 
of the same incident from,a newspaper source notes that the mayor of the 
town and other "good citizens" tried to prevent the invasion, but to nq 
avail. An equally typical example came from Villeneuve (Landes). On 
September 8, 1830, after an apparent agreement among peasants and mer- 
chants not to pay tolls or excise taxes, the mayor (assisted bi gendarmes 
and National Guards) sought to enforce the collection of taxes at the 
local fair. A crowd beat the mayor and drove a herd of steers into him. 
The National Guards of Villeneuve and adjacent communes eventually made 
89 arrests. (Archives Nationales 8818 1187 ; Gazette - des Tribunaux, 
11/25/183n: Journal des Dghats, 10/13/1830) Again, the same pattern: 
rural interests seize the occasion of the post-revolutionary period to 
challenge the ability of the local representatives of the central au- 
thorities to make good their customary demands. 
Attacks like these, endemic during this period, were no mere 
symbolic gestures. One of the main political issues of the time--both 
before and after the revolution--was the ability of the central govern- 
ment to squeeze taxes out of the rural populace. These events in the 
fall of 1830 represent another process of testing, as those in control 
of the central governrent struggled to consolidate its power and to 
exclude the rural poor froa participation in the polity. The fact of 
a change of power at the top had resulted in a scramble for position among 
the other contenders within the polity, with each group seeking to 
establish its claim for what it saw as most crucial to it. The rural 
contenders sinply responded to the new power arrangement at the center 
as an opportunity to press harder than ever for the same interests which 
they had been pursuing all along. 
Nor were the rural poor the.only groups whose representatives 
asserted their claims against the new government immediately after the 
revolution. Paris itself was the scene of a number of protests from 
its poorer citizens: the events of the fall demonstrated that the critical 
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role of workers during the revolution had not led to working-class support 
for the middle-class government. Finally, in December of 1830, the trial 
of the ministers of deposed Charles X brought about a massive riot which 
rocked the new government. It showed plainly that the situation had not 
"re-equilibrated" itself during the months since the revolution.. 
Urbanity and Collective Violence 
Another significant comparison in the nature of participation in 
violent collective conflict during this period lies in the urbanity of 
their settings. Table 1 shows the estiaated number of participants in 
violent events during each period by the urbanity of the departments in 
which the events occurred. (At the time, France was divided into 86 
administratfve units, or departments, 'averaging about 375,000 in popula- 
tion.) The entries in each cell are rates per 100,000 population, 
corrected to an annual basis. Of course, the fact that an event took 
place in a department with more than 15 percent of its population 
in urban.places does not necessarily rean the event itself was urban; 
a violent event in an urban department can still take place outside 
the confines of the city. 
The comparisons are striking. The urhan departments show con- 
sistently higher rates of participation in violent events throughout. 
Nevertheless, the geographic pattern varies considerably from one 
period to the next. The correlation coefficients at the.bottom of 
each column in Table 1 conveniently sunmarize the varying strength 
of the relationship between the urbanity of a department and the 
volume of participation in its violent events. The coefficients dis- 
play both the general tendency of participants in violence to concen- 
trate in the more urban departments and the sharp fluctuation of the 
Table 1: Estimated Participants in Collective Violence per 100,000 Population by Urbanity of 
Department, 1830-32 (corrected to annual basis) 
Percent of popula- Total Total 
tion in cities of Jan.-June July-Aug. Sept.-Dec. 1830- Participants Population 
10, OOO+ 1830 1830 1830 1831 1832 1832 (Thousands) (Millions) - - -
0 23 19 54 5 22 20 3.8 6.4 
0.1-5.0 7 4 2 84 0 6 4 3 4 6.7 . 6.5 
5.1-10.0 0 9 2 21 8 34 7 5 66 19.8 10.0 
10.0-15.0 18 7 20 136 19 21 3 135 19.5 4.8 
15.1+ 28 2904 41 3 719 8 23 727 104.4 4.8 
TOTAL 13 573 175 120 . 193 158 154.2 32.5 
Total Participants 
(Thousands) 
r, participants x . 
urban population 
pattern from period to period. The rapid geographic fluctuation in it- 
self is a finding of some importance, for it suggests two interesting 
conclusions: a) the locus and character of the issues about which 
Frenchmen were fighting shifted dramatically as the revolution moved 
from phase to phase: b) other studies which have found strong relations 
between levels of conflict and structural variables at a single point 
in time may well have mistaken historically contingent relationships 
for general effects of structure. 
How did the pattern change as the revolution proceeded? During 
the pre-revolutionary period, we find low rates throughout France; they 
do not differ greatly amone the groups of departments. The picture 
changes drastically, however, once the revolution gets underway. During 
the revoluti.onary period, the extent of violence rose sharply for all 
classes of departments except the most rural ones: the change produced 
a strong relationship between urbanity and violent conflict. In the 
months following the change of government the disparity between the 
most and the least urban departnents narrowed; the rates in the less 
urban departvents rose, re~istering the shift of focus of conflict 
from the largest urhan centers toward the provincial towns and the 
countryside. Concretely, the swelling of rates in the less urban 
departments during the closing months of 1830 represented the spread 
of tax rebellions and similar fom.s of resistance to central control. 
During 1831 and 1832, the differentials between the most and least 
urban departments widened agai-n, although in 1831 the persistence of 
tax conflicts in the moderately rural departments while struggles 
among the members of-the revolutionary coalition accelerated in Paris 
an.d other large cities red.uced the correlation Between urbanity and 
rates of participation. The largest single conflict of 1831 was the 
bloody revolt of the Lyon silk workers. In 1832, 'levels of involve- 
ment in collective violence rose in all classes of departments: in 
April, May and June they approached the heights bf July and August, 
1830, as repeated street-fighting in Paris coincided with widespread 
guerrilla in the counter-revolutionary West. 
Statistics like these, showing the prominent place of urban 
settin& in political violence, have convinced many observers that . .. . ', . ..- . 
violence stems directly from migration, or specifically urbanization. 
It is true, of course, that both Paris and most of the other cities 
where extensive collective conflict took place during this period !I@ 
undergone considerable relatively rapid growth in preceding years. 
But further analvsis of our data shows that it k7as urbanity itself, 
rather than the process of urbanization, which was most strongly as- 




Table 2 present regression coefficients for four.departmenta1 
variables--total population, urban population, net migration and increase 
of urban population--as predictors of man-days expended in disturhances. 
Urban population itself is the most durable predictor of level of 
collective conflict over the five periods shown here. ~xtent of 
urban increase is probably the next strongest predictor. Net migra- 
tion itself is a relatively weak influence compared to these two. 
None of the four indicators is particularly strong for the 
pre-revolutionary period: the coefficients much greater for the year 
Table  2: S t a n d a r d i z e d  Regress ion  C o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  Man-Days Expended i n  V i o l e n t  I n c i d e n t s  i n  France,  
1830-1832, by p e r i o d .  
Independent V a r i a b l e s  
T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  Urban Pop- Net Migra t ion ,  Urban I n c r e a s e ,  M u l t i p l e  
P e r i o d  1831 u l a t i o n ,  1831 1826-1831 '1821-1831 R 
January-June,  1830 . ..0734 -. 2407 - . I423 .3458 . I964 
July-Augus t , 1830 - .4410 .9949 -. 1615 .2206 .9421 
1831 a r e  only  somewhat s t r o n g e r  . These a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  .per iods  wi th  
t h e  l e a s t  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence .  During t h e s e  two pe r iods  urban inc rease  
shows some .importance a s  a  p r e d i c t o r  of l e v e l s  of col1,ect ive v io lence .  
But dur ing  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  and immediate pos t - revolu t ionary  per iods  
of 1830 and throughout 1832--in s h o r t ,  during t h e  most t u r b u l e n t  periods-- 
u rban i ty  i t s e l f  i s  much t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p r e d i c t o r .  It is  t r u e  t h a t  t h e s e  
f i g u r e s  do not  i n  themselves show t h a t  v i o l e n t  even t s  dur ing  t h i s  t ime 
occurred w i t h i n  towns and c i t i e s .  Table 2 simply shows t h a t  urban 
departments were t h e  scenes  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  though a n  exahina t ion  
o f . t h e  i n c i d e n t s  themselves shows t h a t  they  took p l a c e  l a r g e l y  i n  towns 
and c i t i e s  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  nearby count rys ide .  
.There a r e  some s p e c i a l  p o i n t s  worth no t ing  i n  t h e  r a t e s  f o r  
France a s  a  whole. These f i g u r e s  should make i t  c l e a r  t h a t ,  however 
modest t h e  f i n a l  rearrangements  i n  French s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  brought about  
by t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  t h e  events  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  per iod  d i d  a c t i v a t e  
t h e  French populace. The number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  dur ing  t h e  two-month 
r evo lu t iona ry  pe r iod ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  most urban departments ,  shows a 
remarkably high l e v e l  of involvement i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  t o t a l  popula.tion. 
1830 may have lacked t h e  long-term s o c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Great 
Revolut ion of 1789, b u t  i t  was c e r t a i n l y  no p a l a c e  coup, no mat te r  of 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  bu lk  of t h e  French populat ion.  
The P a r t i c i p a n t s  
S t i l l  a  f u r t h e r  comparison of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  t h e  
process  of r evo lu t ion  of d i f f e r e n t  groups w i t h i n  t h e  French p o l i t y  comes 
from a n  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  formations t ak ing  p a r t  i n  v i o l e n t  events .  A 
formation i s  a group t ak ing  a n  independent r o l e  i n  a d is turbance ,  a s  
reckoned by i t s  apparent  autonomy o r  o rgan iza t ion ,  d i s t i n c t n e s s < . o f ' .  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  e t c .  I n  some in s t ances ,  l i k e  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of government 
t a x a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  dur ing  t h e  immediate pos t - revolu t ionary  per iod ,  t h e  
sample r eco rds  only  a s i n g l e  formation,  s i n c e  t h e  i n s u r g e n t s  had no 
a n t a g o n i s t s  p re sen t  i n  person on t h e  scene.  The more common c a s e  is  two 
formations c o n t e s t i n g  w i t h  each o t h e r .  Some i n s t a n c e s  con ta in  t h r e e  o r  
more formations,  i n  d i f f e r e n t  combinations of a l l i a n c e  w i t h  o r  antagonism 
a g a i n s t  one ano the r .  For every i n c i d e n t  we have at tempted t o  ga ther  as 
much informat ion  as p o s s i b l e  about t h e  i d e n t i t y  of  t h e  formations tak ing  
p a r t  and t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  This  makes i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  
compare, i n  Table 2 ,  t h e  p ropor t iona te  involvement of v a r i o u s  k inds  
of formations throughout t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  per iod .  
The s h i f t s  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  du r ing  t h i s  p e r i o d  a r e  worth no t ing  
i n  d e t a i l ,  f o r  they  demonstrate  a number of  changes suggested by our 
model. Ove ra l l ,  Table  3 shows a broad t r end  toward t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  
of v i o l e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n f l i c t .  The "simple crowdt1--any group r e c r u i t e d  
simply by v i r t u e  of  i t s  members having been i n  one p a r t i c u l a r  p l ace  a t  
a p a r t i c u l a r  time--decreases i n  p ropor t iona te  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from its 
pre- revolu t ionary  h igh  t o  a markedly lower l e v e l  dur ing  1831 and 1832. 
I n  genera l ,  t h e  p ropor t ion  of  occupat iona l  groups a l s o  decreases ,  except  
dur ing  t h e  immediate pos t - revolu t ionary  per iod ,  when t h e  p r o t e s t s  of 
wine-growers and c e r t a i n  urban working-class groups appa ren t ly  swe l l s  
t h e  r a t e .  Growing over time, however, a r e  t h e  r a t e s  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by 
r e p r e s s i v e  forces--pol ice,  army, n a t i o n a l  guard, etc.--and " ideologica l  
groups." The l a t t e r  a r e  formations which, i n  ou r  judgment, were r e c r u i t e d  
and def ined  i n  terms of a l l e g i a n c e  t o  some s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  
o r  grouping. The i n c r e a s e  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t h e s e  two groups sugges ts  
t h a t ,  w i th  t h e  r evo lu t ion ,  t h e  bus ines s  of a c t i n g  o u t  v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  
Table 3: Types of Formations P a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  C o l l e c t i v e  Violence, 
1830-1832 (Percent  of t o t a l  in s p e c i f i e d  per iod)  
Per iod  
Jan.-June July-Aug. Sept.-Dec. 
Formation Type 1830 i830 1830 18 31 1832 - Tota l  
Simple crowd 30.8 22.2 23.5 12.0 - 15.1 17.4 
I d e o l o g i c a l  
group 0.0 29.6 5.9 24.0 28.8 22.6 
Occupat i o n a l  
group 23.1 11.1 21.6 12.0 6.2 11.1 
Repressive 
f o r c e  7.7 25.9 33.3 42.0 41.8 37.3 
Other 
To ta l  100.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.1 99.9 
Number of 
Format i o n s  1 3  2 7 51 50 146 287 
Chi-square, 16  d . f .  = 39.1, p < . O 1  
became very  much a mat te r  f o r  spec i a l i s t s - - the  agen t s  of  t h e  government, 
on  t h e  one hand, and a c t i v i s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of va r ious  p o l i t i c a l  
t endencies ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  
To some e x t e n t ,  c e r t a i n  of t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  may s t e m  from t h e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  of our  knowledge of t h i s  pe r iod .  The r eade r s  and coders  
may, i n  some cases ,  have i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  presence  of format ions  i n  a 
more i d e o l o g i c a l  l i g h t  simply by v i r t u e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r evo lu t ion  
had occurred .  Nevertheless ,  t h e  broad o u t l i n e s  o f  changing p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
which we have der ived  from Table 2 a r e  probably accu ra t e .  The p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  of  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s ,  f o r  example, r o s e  as t h e  new government 
s t r o v e  t o  f i x  i t s  c o n t r o l  over t h e  po . l i ty .  The f r equenc ie s  of p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  by r e p r e s s i v e  formations f o r  1830-1832 were as fol lows:  
Percent  o f  Violent  Events i n  which 
Per iod  Repressive Forces were P resen t  
July-Aug. 1830 4 3 
Sep t . -Dec . 1830 59 
Since  r e p r e s s i v e  formations--troops, p o l i c e ,  Nat iona l  Guards and o t h e r  
armed f o r c e s  employed by governments--are r e l a t i v e l y  easy t o  i d e n t i f y  i n  
our  r eco rds ,  t h e r e  seems l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  a major change i n  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r  of  v i o l e n t  encounters  occurred a s  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  moved on. As 
t h e  s u r v i v o r s  of t h e  revolu t ionary  c o a l i t i o n  sought t o  conso l ida t e  t h e i r  
c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government, they i n c r e a s i n g l y  used organized fo rce  
a g a i n s t  t h e i r  enemies. 
Although they have r a r e l y  been documented as s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  as 
they a r e  he re ,  t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and t h e  r i s e  of 
r e p r e s s i v e  formations a f t e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power a r e  we l l  known t o  
h i s t o r i a n s  of r evo lu t ion .  The promulgators  of n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  schemes 
f o r  r e v o l u t i o n  ought t o  consider  those  two phenomena c a r e f u l l y ,  f o r  they 
i d e n t i f y  some s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  schemes a v a i l a b l e  t o  us  s o  f a r .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  s t r o n g  v a r i a t i o n  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from group t o  group and 
time t o  t ime r ende r s  implaus ib le  ( o r  a t  l e a s t  inadequate)  those  t h e o r i e s  
which t r a c e  r e v o l u t i o n  back t o  a  gene ra l i zed  s ta te  of  t e n s i o n  o r  f r u s t r a -  
t i o n .  We have no t  undertaken t h e  demonstrat ion he re ,  b u t  i t  does no t  
appear t h a t  i n  any reasonable  s ense  of  t h e  words t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  were 
drawn from t h e  t e n s e s t  o r  most f r u s t r a t e d  segments of t h e  populat ion,  
o r  t h a t  t h e  change i n  t he  s t r u c t u r e  o f  d i s tu rbances  corresponded t o  a  
s h i f t  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t ens ion  o r  f r u s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  popula t ion  
a t  l a r g e .  Changes i n  t h e  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of  p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e  
groups a t  t h e  l o c a l  and n a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  l a y  behind t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  we 
have de t ec t ed .  
Second, t h e  r i s i n g  prominence o f  r e p r e s s i v e  forces- i n  t h e s e  
v i o l e n t  c o n f l i c t s  bespeaks t h e  heavy involvement of ,governments  i n  t h e  
s t r u g g l e s  behind them. It is t h e r e f o r e  improper t o  a t t r i b u t e  t he  . 
succes s ive  phases of a r evo lu t ion  t o  changes i n  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  
popula t ion  a t  l a r g e  o r  even t o  changes i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of some s i n g l e  
group of "rebels ."  An adequa'te theory  has  t o  d e a l  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s  among 
contenders  and governments. 
Third,  both t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  and t h e  r i s e  of r e p r e s s i o n  grow C. 
from two l a r g e  processes  which a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  r evo lu t ion ,  b u t  have l i t t l e  
p l ace  i n  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  t h e o r i e s  of  revolu t ion :  1 )  t h e  s t r u g g l e  of 
those  who have s e i z e d  power t o  reimpose c o n t r o l  over  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  
popula t ion ,  which o f t e n  produces a wider  and f i e r c e r -  c o n f l i c t  than  t h e  
i n i t i a l  t r a n s f e r  of power; 2) t h e  breaking  up of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n ,  and t h e  e f f o r t  of some members of t h a t  c o a l i t i o n  t o  exclude 
o t h e r s  from power. These a r e  t h e  processes  which t end  t o  produce f a r  
h ighe r  l e v e l s  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  revolut . ionary 
t r a n s f e r  of  power than  be fo re  i t .  Among na tu ra l -h i s to ry  t h e o r i s t s ,  
Crane Br in ton  (an expe r t  h i s t o r i a n  of t h e  French Revolution) and 
P i t i r i m  Sotokin (an a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  t h e  Russian Revolution) were 
we l l  aware of t hese  processes ;  i n  gene ra l  terms, however, bo th  of them 
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e s e  processes  t o  t h e  con f ron ta t ion  between a tendency of 
t h e  most r u t h l e s s ,  extreme r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  t o  suc.ceed t h e i r  moderate 
b re th ren ,  and t h e  i n t o l e r a b i l i t y  of extremism t o  o rd ina ry  people.  
Nei ther  of t hese  p r i n c i p l e s  exp la ins  much of 1830's  n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y .  
Nor i s  1830 a s p e c i a l  case ,  except  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  a l l  revolu- 
t i o n s  a r e  s p e c i a l  ca ses .  The p a r a l l e l  d a t a  we have assembled f o r  t h e  
French r e v o l u t i o n  of 1848 ( see  T i l l y  1970, 1972) f a l l  i n t o  similar 
p a t t e r n s :  widespread r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  re impos i t ion  of c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l ,  
v i o l e n t  pos t - revolu t ionary  s t r u g g l e s  among t h e  members of t h e  revolu- 
t i o n a r y  c o a l i t i o n ,  important  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  geographic p a t t e r n  of v io l ence  
,' 
corresponding t o  t h e  o s c i l l a t i n g  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power, f a r  h ighe r  l e v e l s  
of involvement a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  t r a n s f e r  of power, and s o  on. We do 
not  have the  same s o r t  o f  sys temat ic  d a t a  f o r  t he  g r e a t  r e v o l u t i o n  which 
began i n  1789; we recognize ,  moreover, t h a t  t h e  even t s  of  t h a t  r e v o l u t i o n  
had a  f a r  wider  impact than  d id  those  of  1830 and 1848. Within t h e  
l i m i t s  of t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  we have o f f e r e d ,  neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  1789 
r evo lu t ion  a l s o  appears  t o  exemplify. t h e  p a t t e r n .  That should hardly' be  
s u r p r i s i n g ,  s i n c e  i t  was  o u r . r e f l e c t i o n  on 1789 and its a f t e rma th  which 
f i r s t  l e d  u s  toward r e j e c t i n g  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  models and formulat ing 
ou r  a l t e r n a t i v e  model. 
There a r e ,  of course ,  some d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o u r  argument and i n  t h e  
evidence we have o f f e r e d  f o r  i t .  We have n o t  provided r e l i a b l e  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  contenders  o r  f o r  indexing  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  
independent ly of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s t r u g g l e s  we propose t o  expla in ;  
i n s t e a d ,  we have r e l i e d  on s c h o l a r l y  consensus concerning t h e  main b locs  
involved i n  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  of 1830. Such a consensus o f t e n  does not  
e x i s t .  Even where i t  does,  i t  can h a r d l y  form a r e l i a b l e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  
s o r t  of comparable measurement over many cases  which t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
of our  argument would r e q u i r e .  
Again, our  scheme y i e l d s  only r a t h e r  weak in fe rences  concerning 
t h e  k inds  of c o u n t r i e s  and/or  pe r iods  i n  which r e v o l u t i o n  is  l i k e l y .  It 
does l i t t l e  more than  r e d i r e c t  t h e  s e a r c h  away from gene ra l  tempos of 
s t r u c t u r a l  change o r  broad l e v e l s  of  t e n s i o n  toward t h e  format ion  of 
p o l i t i c a l  c o a l i t i o n s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  making ' c e r t a i n  k i n d s  of  c la ims .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  evidence presented  i n  t h i s  paper  r a i s e s  doubts  about  
convent ional  n a t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l  ana lyses ,  bu t  i t  is  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r u l e  
o u t  a  number of a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of r evo lu t iona ry  processes .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e s  i nc lude  t h e  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  f rus t r a t ion -aggres s ion  
formula t ions  which have been appearing i n  r ecen t  yea r s .  We a r e  i n c l i n e d  
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  f ru s t r a t ion -aggres s ion  road, too ,  t u r n s  i n t o  a  
b l i n d  a l l e y ,  i f  no t  t h e  same one t o  which n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  reads .  But 
t h e r e  we may be  proved wrong. However t h e  sea rch  among t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
avenues now open t o  t h e  s tuden t  of r e v o l u t i o n  f i n a l l y  t u r n s  out ,  i t  w i l l  
surely take us to a much more explici t  theory of the pol i t ica l  process 
i t s e l f  than modern sociologists and psychologists-of revolution have 
been will ing to employ. 
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